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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to explore the state of post-9/11 Muslim American 
philanthropy within The Greater Kansas City Area.  Since 2001, the U.S. government has 
expanded its counterterrorism policies to target sources of terrorist funding and in particular the 
charitable sector.  Many Muslim Americans practice the Islamic traditions of zakāt (obligatory 
alms) and ṣadaqah (discretionary charity) as a means of honoring faith, strengthening the 
community and preserving religious identity.  There is a perception, however, that these practices 
are in direct conflict with U.S. counterterrorism policy.  The outcome of the decade long War on 
Terrorism is telling; to date, The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has 
shut down seven US-based Islamic charities and frozen over $2.3 billion in charitable assets 
(TAR, 2012: 2) in the effort to stem terrorist funding.  These actions were taken under the 
auspices of national security, however, they gave a perception that U.S. policies trump Muslim 
American civil rights and discourage Islamic philanthropy; “The passage of both USA Patriot 
Acts, the closing of several Muslim charities, and the curbing of civil liberties beginning with the 
Bush administration and continuing through the Obama administration have caused contributions 
to Muslim American charities, especially those with an international scope, to decrease by up to 
50 percent in the initial years.” (Jamal, 2011: 5).   
The Greater Kansas City Area is no stranger to Islamic culture; according to The 
Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), it has the 98th largest Muslim population out of 
133 U.S. metropolitan centers with eighteen active Islamic congregations (thearda.com).  The 
significant Kansas City Muslim population coupled with a recent stigmatization of Islam drives 
this primary research question:  How have post-9/11 U.S. policies impacted Islamic charitable 
practices of Muslim Americans in the Greater Kansas City Area.  This study employs a mixed-
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method research approach to answering this thesis question.   First, it examines 30 years of U.S. 
policies that culminates in the ‘securitization’ of the nonprofit sector.  This research then 
conducts a comparative analysis of annual budgets from six Muslim and six non-Muslim 
charities in Kansas City to identify donation patterns since 9/11.  Lastly, this study analyzes the 
results of focus group discussions conducted with fourteen volunteers from the Islamic Center of 
Johnson County (ICJC), Kansas City, Kansas to identify changes in individual charity over the 
last 10 years.   
The results of this research suggest that Kansas City’s Islamic charities benefited from 
Muslim philanthropy in spite of post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies.  Additionally this 
research suggests that Muslim Americans in Kansas City continue to practice innovative forms 
of charity regardless of prevailing concerns of civil-rights infringement.  This research on the 
Kansas City Muslim American minority complements an academic narrative derived from 
research in other major U.S. metropolitan centers (Najam, Abraham, Howell, Shryock, and 
Hadaad).  Its findings can be used to inform the opinions of local community leaders and serve 
as a starting point for broader, more comprehensive research on Kansas City’s Muslim 
community. 
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Introduction 
 
The goal of this research is to inquire into a key tenet of the Islamic faith: charity.   
Specifically, it seeks to gage the condition of Kansas City’s Muslim American charitable 
practices in a post-9/11 environment.  Over thirty years ago U.S. lawmakers made a concerted 
effort to craft legislation that addressed increasing incidents’ of international terrorism.  Since 
1993, U.S. laws have broadened focus to include domestic terrorism and potential supporters of 
terrorism.  After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. legislation essentially securitized the nonprofit 
sector, targeting anti-terrorist funding through charitable organizations.  With Islam’s strong 
emphasis on charitable giving, the Muslim American community was ascribed immediate ‘guilt 
by association’ in U.S. war on terrorism.  The broader campaign to prevent any charity from 
potentially supporting terrorism had an immediate, adverse effect on Islamic philanthropy in the 
U.S:  “The passage of both USA Patriot Acts, the closing of several Muslim charities, and the 
curbing of civil liberties beginning with the Bush administration and continuing through the 
Obama administration have caused contributions to Muslim American charities, especially those 
with an international scope, to decrease by up to 50 percent in the initial years.” (Jamal, 2011; 5). 
The results of the anti-terrorist funding policies are mixed; to date, $2.3 billion in 
charitable funds are frozen by the U.S. Treasury (TAR, 2012: 3) yet there have been no 
substantiated claims of U.S. charities funding terrorism.   The resulting civil liberty debate 
between Muslim Americans and the U.S. government has been ongoing since the late 1990s and 
has occupied headlines of major news media outlets.  The Greater Kansas City Area is home to a 
diverse Muslim community that seems to have eluded this media and national attention.  This is 
a phenomenon that entreats further inquiry:  How have post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism policies 
affected the charitable practices of Muslim Americans in the Greater Kansas City Area?   
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  This topic reveals America’s challenge with protecting itself against sophisticated and 
evolving terrorist threats while honoring religious plurality and the guarantee of civic freedoms.  
This research shows that the U.S. has failed to achieve both of these goals simultaneously.  This 
American dichotomy was suggested over 170 years earlier by the French philosopher and 
witness to U.S. Democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville: “If ever freedom is lost in America, one will 
have to blame the omnipotence of the majority that will have brought minorities to despair and 
have forced them to make an appeal to material force.” (Translated by Winthrop, Mansfield 
2011: 249) 
  It was Mustafa Hussein, director of the Islamic Society of the Greater Kansas City 
(ISGKC), which first introduced me to this contentious topic.  By the time I had befriended him 
at this mosque in the spring of 2011, I had completed several college courses on Middle East 
history, Islam and two semesters of the Arabic language.  I could rattle off the five pillars of 
Islam in Arabic and I was vaguely aware that zakāt meant ‘alms’.  When I greeted Mustafa with 
my first Assalamu alaikum, I was determined to discover meaningful graduate research that 
highlighted Kansas City’s unique Islamic community.   Over the course of many enjoyable visits, 
he proved to be an active community partner or constituent (Bringle, Clayton, Price, 2009: 2) in 
helping me frame a civic-oriented research question.  Mustafa did more than just correct my poor 
Arabic grammar; over the course of multiple enjoyable visits, he explained to me in detail the 
Islamic concepts of zakāt and ṣadaqah.  He showed me objective and researchable ‘leads’ that I 
could pursue to define a cultural misunderstanding within the United States.  What started as a 
binder full of meeting notes has evolved into research topic that most Americans pay little 
attention to; a program of government policies that seem to attack Muslim American civil 
liberties and discourage Islamic charitable practices.  The resultant research explores the impact 
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of social policy on a segment of Kansas City’s Muslim American community.  It is a preliminary 
case study into ‘service learning’ and ‘civic engagement’ (Bringle, Clayton and Price, 2009: 1) 
with Kansas City’s Islamic community that is nested within the academic discipline of 
Sociology. 
The U.S. Challenge: 
The average American does not fully grasp the complexity of the Muslim American 
community.  Attempting an approximation of the Muslim American population produces a wide 
range of results.  Author Yvonne Haddad describes this challenge with a range of figures and 
sources: “…from two million, as reported by B’nai Brith, to as many as eleven million, as 
reported by Warith Deen Mohammad, Leader of the Muslim American Society (MAS), the 
largest African-American Muslim organization.  The Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR), in all of its communiqués, gives the figure as seven million Muslims.” (Haddad, 2011:  
2)  Another source, The 2009 Pew Research Center Poll cited the Muslim American population 
at “…about 2.5 million…’ (Pew: 2009, 24)  Religious scholar Jocelyn Cesari puts the number at 
an ‘estimated 4-5 million’ (Cesari, 2011: 24).  Even the smallest population figure presented 
above would be a significant stakeholder within America’s religious plurality.   
This Muslim presence in the U.S. dates back to the slave industry in the 1700s (Diouf,  
1998: 45; Leonard, 2011: 2003).  Since then, successive waves of Muslim immigrants have been 
driven to America by economic opportunity, conflict, and persecution.  This Muslim population 
is further broken down into ethnically and culturally diverse communities spread throughout U.S. 
metropolitan centers.  The current Muslim American demograph includes first and second 
generation immigrants of all races, American converts of all races, members of the Nation of 
Islam and Muslim American Society.  Muslim American families originate from all regions of 
  
 
4 
 
the globe.  Aside from traditional Sunni Islam, other branches are represented as well, to include 
Shi’ite, Sufi and Druze (Haddad, 2011: 4-5). The Muslim American population includes a group 
often misunderstood as exclusively Islamic:  Arabs.  Most Americans don’t realize that the Arab 
ethnic identity is comprised of many other religions aside from Islam.  Arabs, unlike most 
Muslims, share the Arabic language and culture.  Arab families generally originate from around 
the Arabian Peninsula and practice many faiths in addition to from Islam (e.g. Christianity and 
Judaism). Arabs make up an estimated 12-25% of the Muslim American population. (Leonard, 
2003: 7; Cesari, 2004: 24)  Suffice it to say, not all Muslims are Arabs and not all Arabs are 
Muslim. 
With this diverse Muslim American presence and an enduring tradition of Islamic 
philanthropy, one might conclude that the U.S. could benefit from tremendous charitable 
potential.  On the other hand, if the U.S. is in a protracted war with “Transnational extremist and 
terrorist networks” (Terrornomics, 2007: 59) that identify with an extreme version of Islam, then 
Muslim American philanthropy could be perceived as a threat.  The phrase that quickly moved to 
the forefront of the U.S. counterterrorism effort was ‘terror financing’ which:  “… occurs when a 
person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds 
with the intention that these should be used or in the knowledge that these will be used in full or 
in part, to carry out a terrorist act as defined in the above-mentioned convention.”  (Combating 
Money Laundering, 2009: 6)  
The notion of associating Islamic nonprofit organizations with terror financing was 
embraced quickly by U.S. legislators during the post-9/11 investigations conducted by the 
Government.  Specifically, 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States drew the hasty conclusion that Middle East charities were guilty of resourcing the 9/11 
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attacks; “Fund-raisers and facilitators throughout Saudi Arabia and the Gulf raised money for al 
Qaeda from witting and unwitting donors and diverted funds from Islamic charities and 
mosques.” (Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph, 2004: 8) This conclusion, whether justified or 
not, informed the opinion of U.S. policy makers.  The anxiety created in Washington DC 
stemmed from a belief that benevolent, transnational charities (with branch offices in the U.S.) 
used discreet finance channels to fund terrorist attacks.  The natural reflex for lawmakers was to 
look inward at potentially suspect U.S.-based Islamic charities: “…the possibility that the attacks 
[9/11] could have been facilitated by charitable organizations exempt from paying taxes 
threatens to erode public confidence in both the integrity of the charitable community and the 
ability of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to regulate this community.”  (TIGTA Audit Report 
2007-10-082: 1)   
The damage to the Muslim American community was done and end result is now public 
record: since the 9/11 attacks, seven U.S.-based Islamic charities have been shut down by the 
U.S. Treasury and branded Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) for allegedly 
financing terrorist organizations.   This policy dynamic will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 1, but so far no Islamic charity in Kansas City has been shut down.  The closest 
shuttered charity to Kansas City was the Islamic American Relief Association (IARA) of 
Columbia, Missouri: roughly 200 miles to the east. (DOJ Press Release, Jan 11, 2012)  This 
charity was shut down in October 4, 2004 facing 33 criminal indictments with included 
allegations of support to al Qaeda. (IARA v. FBI Agent, 2005: 21) In spite of a relative calm in 
Kansas City’s Muslim American community, there are indicators of anxiety associated with 
Islamic charity.   I observed some of this anxiety during an FBI visit to the Islamic Center of 
Johnson County (ICJC) one afternoon in January 2013.  On that day FBI agents were teaching 
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congregants about civil rights, hate crimes, and how to report offenses.  The agents discussed 
hate crime statistics for 2012 and different ways to contact the FBI Civil Rights Unit.  Overall, 
the presentation was a success, however, the ensuing question and answer session revealed a 
different concern within the congregation:  U.S. counterterrorism law.  General questions from 
these congregants included: Which Islamic practices would make them appear suspicious to the 
government? How should they deal with a ‘radical’ Muslim visiting our mosque?  What kind of 
powers does law enforcement have under the Patriot Act? What are the repercussions for 
donating to the wrong charity?  This question and answer session suggested that this small 
congregation feared that their Muslim way of life would run counter to U.S. law.   This perceived 
anxiety; coupled with the well-publicized closure of seven Muslim organizations and the 
proximity of the defunct IARA beg this research question about Kansas City’s Muslims:  
How have post-9/11 U.S. policies impacted Islamic charitable practices of Muslim 
Americans (zakāt and ṣadaqah) in the Greater Kansas City Area?   
 
My conviction from the outset of this research has been that Muslim Americans in 
Kansas City perceive their civil liberties to be at risk when honoring the religious obligations of 
zakāt and ṣadaqah.  Notwithstanding, I am convinced that Islamic philanthropy in Kansas City 
has not waned; that the city’s Muslims have found creative workarounds to distribute charity to 
those in need at a local, national and international level.  This is an observable trend seen from 
similar research conducted in other U.S. metropolitan centers such as New York, Los Angeles 
and Houston: “Indeed, our survey suggests that while the bulk of our respondents (62 percent) 
say that their giving has remained unchanged since 9/11, far more respondents report that their 
giving has increased (24 percent) than those who say their giving has actually decreased since 
9/11 (14 percent).” (Najam, 2006: 180)  To explore the answer to this question and gage the 
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condition of Kansas City’s Muslim American philanthropy, I pursued the following research 
venues: 
 First, I examined 30 years of U.S. policy at a national level (above state and local  
legislation) that led to the ‘securitization‟ of the nonprofit Sector.   I then researched the 
individual stories of those U.S.-based Islamic charities closed down and designated terrorist 
organizations by the government.  The purpose of this examination is to show to the reader a 
precedence of U.S. policies that have grown to discourage the Islamic faith-based practice of 
charity.  This examination also provides reference and background for further discussion and 
analysis throughout this thesis. 
 Second, I compared and contrasted the charitable budgets of six Kansas City Islamic 
nonprofit organizations with the budgets of six similar non-Muslim organizations.  The purpose 
of this correlative analysis was to identify trends that could help determine if donation patterns of 
the six Kansas City Muslim charities had been adversely impacted by post-9/11 policies and if 
the six non-Muslim organizations had fared differently.  
 I then conducted focus group discussions with fourteen volunteers from the Islamic 
Center of Johnson County (ICJC).  The ICJC is a mosque and a 501(c) (3) non-profit 
organization that has provided religious, educational, and social services to Johnson County 
Muslim Americans since 2000.  I analyzed the results of these discussions in order to gage any 
noticeable impact to charitable practices over the last 10 years as a result of U.S. 
counterterrorism policies.  These discussions garnered the personal perceptions of the ICJC 
volunteers, specifically inquiring if their religious obligations of zakāt and ṣadaqah had changed 
since 9/11 and did they perceive their civil rights to be as risk?  Zakāt and ṣadaqah will be 
further explained in this chapter. 
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To begin approaching this issue, it is important to explain why philanthropy is so integral 
to Islam.  Most American readers from a Judeo-Christian background view alms giving as 
something optional and the thesis topic mentioned above evokes no sense of urgency.  What 
mainstream American readers do not realize is that Muslims the world over are mandated by 
their religion to provide charity for those in need and for the general good of the community 
(maṣlaḥa).   
This is prescribed in the Qur’an, the holy text of Islam, and reinforced in the sayings of 
the Prophet Muhammad (the Sunna).  The Qur’an and Sunna constitute the ‘Basic Code’ of 
Islam (Khan, Ramadan 2012: 21-22) that provides guidance to all faithful Muslims.  The Qur’an 
specifies that the recipients of Islamic charity are: “the poor and the needy, and those employed 
to manage the (funds [zakāt]); For those whose hearts have turned (to truth and belief recently 
[Islam]); For those in slavery (and for the freedom of captives) and in debt; And for (fighters in) 
the cause of Allah; And for the wayfarer: (It is so) ordered by Allah, and Allah is All Knowing, 
All Wise,” (Qur’an, Sura 9.60).  Basically, if one practices Islam, is not poor, and is breathing, 
then he is mandated to give charity.  The two forms of Islamic philanthropy mentioned in basic 
code of Islam are called zakāt and ṣadaqah (Singer, 2008: 21) 
Zakāt is the primary form of Islamic charity.  It is the third pillar of Islam, preceded by 
the shahādah (profession of faith) and ṣalāt (daily prayer).  Similar to Christian concepts of alms 
or tithing, zakāt is the apportionment of the ‘first fruits’ of one’s wealth, specifically: “..2.5 
percent tax levied on certain assets...” (Dallal, Bowen, Richardson, Underwood and Heynemen, 
2004 :156) for charity.  Muslims, like other monotheistic adherents, attribute personal wealth 
directly to the generosity of God.  Giving Zakāt is the Muslim way of acknowledging this.  Zakāt 
purifies and legitimizes one’s wealth: “According to Hebraic teaching, which deeply if often 
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obscurely underlies the Qur’an, the first fruits, like the firstborn of a family and the firstlings of 
animals, belongs to God and are subject to sacrifice.” (Bellion-Jourdan, Benthall, 2003: 22) 
Faithful Muslims generally wait to give zakāt during the ninth (and most holy) month of 
the Islamic calendar; Ramadan, (Esposito, 2004: 35).  During Ramadan the spiritual benefits of 
zakāt are at their optimal for both donor and recipient, a belief echoed in a popular hadīth (saying 
of the Prophet Muhammad): “Narrated to Anas, I asked the Prophet (PBUH), which is the better 
charity?  He said; Charity in Ramadan.” (Jami’ at-Timidhi, zakāt).  Although zakāt is 
compulsory, Muslims believe that this, and all charity should be given with genuine benevolent 
intent to fully benefit from any spiritual reward.  When viewed from a devout Christian 
perspective, tampering with zakāt during Ramadan is much like interfering with the Christmas 
church services; it is highly discouraged.   
Zakāt collection dates to the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, and since then, Muslim 
governments have established state sponsored collection agencies or approved charitable 
institutions to collect and manage zakāt.  With the advent of the internet, however, there is no 
longer need for a zakāt collector; Muslims in America can donate charity on line to just about 
any zakāt manager (e.g. Zakāt Foundation of America, Zakāt Fund Foundation Qatar, and the 
Department of Zakāt and Income Tax Saudi Arabia) provided that the charity does not fall on the 
U.S. government’s list of suspected terrorist supporters, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Ṣadaqah is the more discretionary form of Islamic Charity.  Zakāt has limitations in that 
it is normally given once a year (Ramadan) and predominantly goes to Muslim causes.  
Conversely, ṣadaqah is a means of providing short-notice, voluntary charity to anyone, be they 
Muslim or not (Bellion-Jourdan, Benthall, 2003: 77)  This type of charity can take any form, so 
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long as there is a genuine desire or intent to help someone in need.  A prime example is provided 
by Parisian Imam Fouad Immaraine: “We should think of everything we do as a ṣadaqah, even 
kind words – and even something we do for a non-Muslim, as long as we do it for God’s sake.” 
(Bowen, 2010: 46)  Muslims believe that truly effective ṣadaqah occurs when the donor remains 
anonymous; charity for self-aggrandizement is tantamount to sinning.  The impromptu and 
anonymous nature of ṣadaqah allows Muslims to help out with emergencies and atone for 
wrong-doings throughout the year: “The Qur’an and hadīth together send a clear message to 
Muslims that the choice to do ṣadaqah is one they can ill afford to ignore…, ṣadaqah becomes a 
crucial means for redressing one’s personal balance sheet before God.” (Singer, 2008: 112)  The 
takeaways on Islamic charity are that zakāt and ṣadaqah are part of the ‘genetic make-up’ of 
Islam; they are enduring traditions that help Muslim Americans retain an Islamic identity while 
living in a non-Islamic country.  Moreover, it is important to note that the charitable acts of zakāt 
and ṣadaqah originate from a genuine intent to do benevolent good.  These takeaways are a 
sentiment that I have heard repeatedly while interacting with Muslims in Kansas City. 
Kansas City Muslim Americans:   
As mentioned previously, The Greater Kansas City Area has a substantial Muslim 
American population that requires some discussion for purposes of this thesis.  The book of 
Kansas City’s Muslims has yet to be written as there is no single source that captures arrival, 
integration, nationalities, and growth of Muslim communities since the city’s founding. The few 
pieces of information available come from varied sources, mostly from news clippings or the 
Internet.  The Missouri Valley Special Collection of the Kansas City Library contains a 1976 
ethnic survey recounting the emigration of 50 Lebanese families to Kansas City beginning in the 
latter half of the 18
th
 Century.  These emigrants brought a tradition of Arabic writing, however, 
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they all were Roman Catholics.  (Lamb-Shirmer, 1976: 1-4)  Adding to this is a 2009 local news 
report that discusses the presence of 700 Iraqis (Wilson, 2009). 
Determining the size of Kansas City’s Muslim population has proven to be challenging.  
Open source research on the Muslim population becomes a game of chasing the numbers.  For 
example, the U.S. Census bureau doesn’t survey populations for ethnic or cultural information.  
The Year 2000 U.S. Census was the last survey to monitor ‘Arab Heritage’ statistics, which does 
not necessarily correlate to being a Muslim.  This census cited the total numbers of Lebanese, 
Syrian and Egyptian descendants in Kansas, Missouri and all other U.S. states (census.gov, 
2000).  The Kansas City Star quoted in both 2001 and 2009 that the city had 15,000 Muslims. 
(Bradley, KC Star, 2001, 2009)  In May 2010, the president of Kansas City’s Midland Islamic 
Council estimated: “…the area’s Muslim population at more than 25,000, including 5,000 
Somalis” (Gray, Kansas City Star, 2010).  That same year, the Association of Religion Data 
Archives (ARDA) reported that an: “…estimated 7,078 Muslim adherents (worshipers) formed 
an estimated 35% of the city’s religious worshippers” (thearda.com).  
Breaking down national affinities within Kansas City is equally difficult.  Clues can be 
derived from a 2007 Pew Research study on the total Muslim American population.  This report 
breaks the Muslim population into; American converts, Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians, Lebanese, 
Yemenis, Bangladeshis, Iraqis and Bosnians. (Pew, Muslim Americans, 2007: 15)  While living 
in Kansas City, I have shaken hands with people from each of the above listed nationalities 
except Bangladeshis and Lebanese.  This list is incomplete too in that it excludes associates 
(non-students) I know from Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Syria and Somalia.   
 It is much easier to identify Kansas City’s Islamic faith based organizations, most of 
which, practice varying degrees of zakāt or ṣadaqah.  Typically, these organizations are 
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mosques, schools, cultural centers, civic centers, charities or immigration centers.  Locating 
these organizations is easy if one has a Muslim friend, a phonebook, internet or a car.  Many of 
these Islamic organizations are 501(c) (3) tax-exempt, nonprofit entities.  A quick search of the 
IRS’s online database can reveal helpful details of these tax-exempt organizations 
(irs.gov/charities-&-non-profits/exempt-organizations).  Throughout this research, Muslim 
colleagues have helped me locate Kansas City Islamic organizations as well.  The results of this 
research revealed that Kansas City has at least 28 Islamic faith-based organizations as depicted in 
the two graphics below:   
 
Figure 1-a: Islamic organizations in the Greater Kansas City Area 
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Figure 1-b: Islamic organizations in the Kansas City Central Corridor 
 
Additional details of the 28 organizations depicted above are also listed in Appendix A of 
this research document.  Suffice it to say, Kansas City has substantial charity-generating 
potential, given its Muslim population and multiple faith-based organizations.  On that premise, 
an inquiry into this thesis question is fully warranted:  
How have post-9/11 U.S. policies impacted Islamic charitable practices of Muslim 
Americans (zakāt and ṣadaqah) in the Greater Kansas City Area?   
 
 This thesis is organized into three chapters that should draw a conclusion about the 
impact of post-9/11 U.S. policies on Kansas City’s Muslim Americans. 
Chapter 1:  This is an open source examination of the history of U.S. policies since 1977 
that have effectively ‘securitized‟ the nonprofit sector.   This chapter explores the history of 
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international and domestic terrorist events that have created national security ‘anxiety’ and 
triggered responses to U.S. policy.  It also reviews litigation documents, press releases and media 
sources to compile the individual stories for each U.S.-based Islamic charity that was shut down 
and designated a terrorist organization by the government.  Chapter 1 accounts for the current 
stigma ascribed to Islamic charity and it offers a compelling explanation as to why Muslim 
Americans might hesitate when giving zakāt and ṣadaqah.  I have attempted to arrange all of this 
information (U.S. policies, Terrorist events and closed charities) in a chronological sequence so 
the reader may derive causes, effects and relationships within this timeline.  The timeline created 
in this chapter also serves as a discussional tool used in both field research and analysis.    
Chapter 2:  Examines observations and trends taken from Islamic nonprofit 
organizations, individual Muslim American volunteers and the general research environment 
within Kansas City’s Muslim American community.  Up front, this chapter makes comment on a 
perceived insularity or natural caution from the city’s Muslim community.  The general trends 
and observations in Chapter 2 serve as an informative precursor to the analysis in Chapter 3.  
First, chapter 2 highlights trends from the annual budgets of twelve nonprofit organizations in 
The Greater Kansas City Area since 9/11 (six Islamic and six Non-Islamic charities).  This 
comparison of charitable budgets seeks to address my thesis question on an organizational level 
under the following premise:  if Islamic charities manage zakāt and ṣadaqah, then their annual 
budgets may be indicative of Muslim American philanthropic practices and the charitable 
climate in Kansas City since 9/11.  Chapter 2 also discusses the challenges of gaining the 
fourteen Muslim volunteer respondents and navigating the network of Kansas City’s Islamic 
community.  These volunteers took some difficulty in recruiting over a half year period, and are 
not fully representational of all aspects of Islam in America.  Specifically, this group is mostly 
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male and non-Arab.  By all outward appearances (accents and mannerisms), these respondents 
are first generation Muslim Americans with a predominantly Indo-Pakistani origin.  Specific 
ages were not asked, however, all volunteers indicated they were over 21 years of age.  The 
Sunni mosque they attend, the Islamic Center of Johnson County (ICJC) is also in the extreme 
southwest corner of Kansas City.   This chapter discusses common themes from data collected 
during focus group discussions with these volunteers.  Collectively, these themes and trends 
reveal how Kansas City’s Muslims give charity in a post-9/11 environment and a perceived 
concern for individual rights in light of recent U.S. policy and adverse media. 
     Chapter 3:  Synthesizes observations, trends, and themes from Chapters 1 and 2 to show 
how U.S. policies have impacted the giving practices of Kansas City Muslim Americans.  It 
offers explanation into the heavy-handed approach of U.S. counterterrorism policy and 
substantiates the phenomena of a disenfranchised Muslim American community within Kansas 
City.  This chapter accounts for regional socioeconomic factors in the last 10 years that may have 
influenced data and trends from the previous two chapters.  Chapter 3 cross-references those 
friction points between the U.S. government and Muslim Americans with salient features in the 
basic constitutional rights afforded all American citizens.  The analysis in this chapter will show 
that Kansas City Muslims perceive their civil rights to be at risk, yet suggest that charitable 
contributions overall have not diminished.  Moreover, Chapter 3 will conclude with a description 
of those positive attributes that make up Kansas City’s Islamic philanthropy.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Evolution of U.S. Antiterrorism Financing Policy 
 
The U.S. has acknowledged the need to maintain policies that provide effective security 
against terrorism since the end of the Cold War.  Only in the last 15 years, however, has terror 
financing moved to the forefront of counterterrorism dialogue and even more recently, the 
perception that Islamic charity that has been hijacked to support terrorism (Burr and Collins, 
2006: 143; Levitt, 2006; 19; Emerson, 1998: 17)  Current U.S. terrorist lists are purportedly 
made up of terrorists, sponsors of terrorism and criminal organizations (treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Sanctions); Most Americans don’t know the details of terrorist lists, nor do they 
question religious plurality and free association in the U.S.  This chapter catalogues government 
efforts to stop terror financing and highlights the trend of targeting Muslim American 
philanthropy.  Simultaneously, it chronicles the growth of transnational Islamic charitable and 
relief organizations that have frequently become the target of U.S. law.  Its purpose is to describe 
a precedence of policies that discriminate against Islamic charity, and underscore the relevance 
and importance of the thesis question:  How have post-9/11 policies impacted Islamic charitable 
practices of Muslim Americans in the Greater Kansas City Area?  This chapter is not a 
referendum on the success or failures of U.S. policy nor does it weigh the merits of the last 13 
years worth of litigation in defense of U.S. policy.  Such broad studies go beyond the scope of 
this research.  It is not a treatise on the history of terrorism, or an indictment of Islamic 
philanthropy.  The focus of this chapter is to show how the U.S. shifted its practice of combatting 
state-supported terrorism in a bipolar world order to the current practice of indicting U.S.-based 
Islamic charities in a post 9-11 environment. 
Terrorist support at the close of the Cold War 
  
 
17 
 
The law that occupies the center of anti-terrorism discussion is the famous (or infamous) 
U.S. Patriot Act, followed by less controversial laws like the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act.   All current policies applicable to counterterrorism derive their legitimacy from an 
Act written at the height of the Cold War: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA), Public Law 95-223.  Passed on December 28, 1977, this legislation addressed a body 
of outdated laws that gave presidents a free hand in responding to crises:  “Congress passed 
IEEPA in 1977 as part of the broad post-Watergate attempt to limit unilateral presidential power 
over foreign affairs. In particular, IEEPA was Congress’s attempt to reign in the steadily 
expanding executive discretion to declare and respond to national emergencies under the Trading 
with the Enemy Act (‘TWEA’).” (Sandberg-Zakian, 2011: 99)  Since then, U.S. presidents have 
used the IEEPA to take action against increasing incidents of international terrorism.   
The IEEPA allows the Executive authority to make broad interpretation of threats and 
apply action with little involvement of the legislative and judicial branch.  Section 202 of this 
law provides the defining text:  “…any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in 
whole or substantial part outside United States, if the President declares a national emergency 
with respect to such threat. “ (IEEPA, 1977: Sec 202 [a]).  Presidents have used this law multiple 
times to respond quickly to national crises, for example; Jimmy Carter invoked the IEEPA on 
November 14, 1979 to block Iranian assets in response to the Tehran hostage crisis.  President 
Reagan used it in January 1986 to sanction Libya for state sponsored terrorism.  George H. W. 
Bush employed the IEEPA to protest the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the October 1990 coup in 
Haiti, and the May 1992 Serbian and Montenegrin aggressions in Bosnia Herzegovina (U.S. 
Trade Statutes, 2010: 254-260).   
The two decades after this law’s inception would bring a series of crises that challenged 
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the efficacy of both the U.S. and a growing Islamic relief industry.  Most anti-terrorism literature 
describes a crescendo of extremist activity in the early 1980s that is difficult to attribute to a 
single, unifying cause.  This decade’s headlines might include, but certainly aren’t limited to the 
following events: the February 1979 Iranian revolution (Yaroslav, 2008: 423), the seizure of 
Mecca's Grand Mosque by Armed Radicals (Mahdists) in November 1979 (Cleveland, 2004: 
462), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (Mamdani, 2004: 119), the 
assassination of President Anwar Sadat by the group al Jihād on October 6, 1981(Burr, Collins, 
2006: 147), the October 1983 bombing of U.S. Marines in Beirut by Islamic Jihād (9/11 
Commission, 2004: 96) and October 1985 hijacking of Achille Lauro by Palestinian gunmen 
(Martin, 2006: 515). With U.S. attention focused on the Soviet threat, all other terrorist incidents 
became ancillary, falling into what counterterrorist experts Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon 
call ‘the accepted taxonomy of terror’ (Benjamin, Simon, 2003; 222).   
Bipolar world order from 1980 to 1990 dictated that states aligned with the two super 
powers deal locally with terrorism.  Consequently, the United Kingdom handled the IRA, Spain 
was responsible for the Basque ETA, Egypt contained its Muslim Brotherhood and the U.S. 
sanctioned Libya for the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerby Scotland in 1988, 
(Martin, 2006: 223).  If U.S. citizens were victims of terrorism, then the affiliated country would 
be immediately admonished and possibly placed on the State Department’s list of ‘state sponsors 
of terrorism.’ (Martin, 2006: 113).  Responses available to the U.S. president were reactive and 
just as varied as those threats emerging in the Middle East, i.e. sanctions, punitive bombing 
strikes, or simply removing its citizens, as in the case of the Marine barracks bombing in 1983 
(9/11 Commission, 2004: 96) 
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Islamic relief organizations in this same decade were limited in number and more locally 
based.  Many Arab countries had their own version of the Red Crescent Society, which is the 
counterpart to the Red Cross.  In The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World, 
Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan describe a simple network of Islamic relief 
agencies dating to this period, tied to a region and state: “… haiat al-ighatha al islamiya al-
‘alamiya (International Islamic Relief Organization or IIRO, set up in 1979 in Saudi-Arabia):  
haiat al-ighatha al-islamiya al-‘ifriqiya (Islamic African Relief Agency, set up in 1981 in 
Sudan): and again al-ighatha al-islamiya (Islamic Relief, set up in Britain in 1984).” (Bellion-
Jourdan, 2003: 69)   
Of all the crises mentioned in the early ‘80s, the Soviet-Afghan conflict proved to be the 
most galvanizing for International Islamic outreach. This notion is apparent in Benthall and 
Bellion-Jourdan’s writings: “After the continent of Africa, it was the first great cause that 
mobilized support for Muslims in need.” (Bellion-Jourdan, 2003: 70) It spurred multiple new 
Islamic relief organizations that channeled Middle East resources towards Afghanistan.  In the 
Charitable Crescent, author Jerome Bellion-Jourdan indicates Islamic relief in Afghanistan came 
in three forms: humanitarian relief (ighatha), the spread the Islamic faith (da’wah) and when 
required, aid in armed struggle (jihād).  Bellion-Jourdan refers to ighatha repeatedly in 
Charitable Crescent to mean relief in the form of material support or medical treatment. (Bellion-
Jourdan, 2003: 69-74, 138-9, 142).   Da’wah is best summarized by The Oxford Encyclopedia of 
the Modern Islamic World as: “…a component of Islamic missionary activities – aimed at 
currying proselytes” (Esposito, 2001: 347). 
Of the three terms listed above, jihād is probably the most contentious.  There are many 
publications on terrorist funding that interpret jihād in multiple ways, taking on both positive and 
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negative connotations.  The evolving interpretation of jihād as viewed through Western eyes 
alone could form a separate body of research.  This thesis draws from a definition provided by 
political scientist Mahmood Mamdani, who breaks the term down into greater jihād (jihād 
Akbar) and lesser jihād (jihād Asgar): “The greater jihād, it is said, is a struggle against 
weaknesses of self; it is about how to live and attain piety in a contaminated world.  The lesser 
jihād, in contrast is about self-preservation and self-defense; … it is the source of Islamic notions 
of what Christians call ‘just war’” (Mamdani, 2002: 768).   For purposes of the Soviet-Afghan 
conflict, the lesser jihād seems to apply.  Essentially, on the same battlefield, an Islamic charity 
provided humanitarian relief while operating religious schools and supporting the mujāhidīn or 
Islamic holy warriors.  The lesser jihād may also be a benefit if one’s common enemy was the 
Soviet Union.  As Mamdani contends, those Islamic charities that went to Afghanistan to 
promote ighatha, da’wah, and the lesser jihād, did so with the United States’ tacit approval.  He 
writes: “Simply put, after the defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, the United States 
decided to harness, and even to cultivate, terrorism in the struggle against regimes it considered 
pro-Soviet. “ (Mamdani, 2002: 769) 
Support to terrorism after the fall of communism: 
 Given the disparate nature of the threat, there was little need for stand-alone U.S. 
legislation to address terrorism.  Anne Clunan, Professor at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School 
provides this insight: “The only governmental body focused on the issue [of terrorist financing] 
more or less consistently was the White House, particularly the National Security Council 
(NSC), which since 1985 has coordinated government efforts to counter terrorism.” (Clunan, 
2006: 583)  The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Public Law 99-
399, did spell out antiterrorism enhancements for the diplomatic corps, in addition, it directed the 
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development of an International Antiterrorism Committee, but there were no stipulations to 
target and defeat support to terrorists. Most likely, this owed to the fact that at the date of its 
legislation, the U.S. had not experienced a credible terrorist threat on American soil.   
This changed On January 25, 1993 when a Pakistani gunman armed with an AK47, 
attacked CIA headquarters in Virginia,.  Two CIA employees were killed and several people 
were injured (Martin, 2006: 375).  A month later, Kuwaiti-born Ramzi Yousef, with three 
accomplices of Middle Eastern origin exploded a truck bomb directly under Tower #I of the 
World Trade Center.  This bomb did not have the same devastation as the subsequent 9/11 
attacks would, but it did kill six people and injure over one hundred others.  Terrorism experts 
Benjamin and Simon describe the bomb as: “…ripping a 150-square-foot crater in the nearly 
foot-thick concrete floor and demolishing much of the surrounding structure.  The blast blew 
through the concourse level of the Vista Hotel two floors up, as well as three floors down.” 
(Benjamin, Simon, 2003; 14).  The scale of this event was enough to force a reassessment of the 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  Investigation into the first WTC attack revealed a fledgling 
terrorist network that the U.S. would come to know as al Qaeda.  Nineteen months after this 
bombing, in September 1994, The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act became 
public Law.   
This legislation introduced a provision stating that it is a federal crime for anyone in the 
U.S. to support or assist a terrorist.   This was a significant change in U.S. counterterrorism 
strategy, as put forward by Clunan: “During the 1990s, the Clinton administration began to 
slowly redefine the threat of terrorism as one separate from the traditional paradigm of state 
sponsors against which economic and military sanctions could be applied.” (Clunan, 2006: 587).  
With a transforming understanding of the transnational terrorist threat, President Clinton signed 
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Executive Order (EO) 12947, in January 1995, thereby prohibiting transactions with terrorists 
that threatened the Middle East Peace Process.  Viewed as an essential measure in the OSLO 
Peace Accords, this order made it a federal offense to have “any transaction or dealing” with 
twelve specific Palestinian terrorist organizations identified within its annex.  This order 
officially designated the transnational organizations Hamas and Hezbollah as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO).  President Clinton also invoked the 1977 IEEPA in executive order 12947.  
He revised this order significantly three years later as EO 13099, adding “Usama bin 
Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Usama bin Ladin) and three al-Qaeda affiliated 
organizations to the terrorist list.  
International conditions in the early 1990s also transformed Islamic relief organizations.  
Some Muslim countries perceived the 1992 conflict between Serbian Christians and Bosnian 
Muslims as attempts to eradicate Islamic culture in the western Balkans.  A similar view was 
taken in the 2004 Russian occupation of Muslim Chechnya.  The Islamic relief community that 
evolved in Afghanistan transplanted itself into these new conflicts introducing the same ighatha, 
da’wah and lesser jihād that had been perfected since the Soviet-Afghan conflict, with two major 
distinctions.  First, Bosnia involved a greater number of Western relief agencies and 
multinational forces, drawing increased scrutiny to the practices of and jihād.  Second, the 
federation of Islamic charities deployed to the Balkans coalesced to a greater degree than 
Afghanistan would have permitted.   
This coalescence had the benefit of combining and professionalizing Islamic relief efforts 
(Benthall, 2003: 75).  In some instances, however, this became an opportunity to propagate 
potentially extreme schools of thought.  Jerome Bellion-Jourdan suggest as much in The 
Charitable Crescent, describing a 1992 conference of Islamic organizations for Bosnian relief: 
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“A common identification with Sunni Islam united these diverse organizations.  Moreover, it is 
at this pole that we find those that promoted a Salafi or Wahhabi concept of Islam.” (Bellion-
Jourdan, 2003: 139)  U.S. federal agencies experienced a similar unease as the FBI monitored 
Hamas fundraising conventions in Oklahoma City in 1988, Kansas City in 1989 and Philadelphia 
in 1993. (Levitt, 2006; 147-150) 
Even as the National Security Council attempted to preserve the Middle East peace 
process, the rash of mid-1990 terrorist attacks worldwide made the U.S. appear ineffectual.  The 
March 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway by the cult Aum Shinrikyo caught 
international intelligence experts off guard (Martin, 2006: 211).  When Timothy McVeigh 
bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, the nation came to an 
emotional standstill (Benjamin, Simon, 2003: 444).  In November 1995, Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula bombed central Riyadh, killing seven U.S. citizens (Martin, 2006: 375). Although 
these major incidents were isolated and unrelated U.S. intelligence saw the emergence of 
persistent, stateless international terrorist organizations.  In short order, al Qaeda overtook 
Hamas and Hezbollah on the U.S. list of credible threats. 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was passed into law on 24 
April 1996.  It served as an inoculation to the American justice system in light of the recent spike 
in international terrorism.  This law brought substantial changes in antiterrorism policy including 
new procedures for writs of habeas corpus (summoning prisoners in front of a judge), 
compensation for U.S. victims of terrorism, plus new restrictions on chemical weapons and 
plastic explosives.  The AEDPA also issued grants to strengthen terrorist response capabilities 
within law enforcement.  It introduced the term Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a 
designation given to organizations that threaten “… the security of the United States nationals or 
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the security of the United States.” (AEDPA, Title III, [302])  This law also took a step closer to 
securitizing the nonprofit sector, making it a crime to raise funds for terrorism:  “...some foreign 
terrorist organizations, acting through affiliated groups or individuals, raise significant funds 
within the United States, or use the United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds raised in 
other nations; and foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” 
(AEDPA, Title III, [ 302]).  
Gus Martin, Professor of criminal justice at California State University explains the 
difference between anti-terrorism and counterterrorism in the book Understanding Terrorism.  
According to Martin, the first term anti-terrorism means physical protective measures such as 
hardened sites, increased surveillance, or enhanced security.  Meanwhile, he states that: 
“...counterterrorism refers to proactive policies that specifically seek to eliminate terrorist 
environments and groups.”  (Martin 2006: 476)  By all outward appearances, the AEDPA was 
adequate legislation commensurate to the threat of post-Cold War terrorism yet safely grounded 
within the individual rights provided by the U.S. Constitution.  Within the context of Martin’s 
explanation, however, the AEDPA was solely an anti-terrorist policy.  It provided for preparation 
against a possible terrorist attack, but lacked the proactive measures to eliminate causes of 
terrorism.  
After its legislation, the merits of the AEDPA were tested in terrorist incidents over the 
next five years.  This included the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi 
Arabia (Zabel, Benjamin, 2008: 15) the June 1996 attack on tourists in Luxor by al-Gamaat al-
Islamiyya (Mamdani, 2004: 168) and the July 1996 bombing during the Atlanta Olympic Games 
(Benjamin, Simon, 2003: 250).  It was during the latter part of the 1990s, however, when Al 
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Qaeda’s influence was seen, along with AEDPA shortfalls.  On 23 Feb 1998 Osama bin Laden 
issued a dubious and unqualified fatwa calling for Muslims to kill Americans and U.S allies.  
(Benjamin, Simon, 2003: 148).   Later that year, in August 1998, al Qaeda funded terrorist cells 
simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (9/11 
Commission Report, 2004: 115).  In the ensuing investigations, President Clinton pushed for a 
coordinated effort to defeat terrorist funding: “An NSC-led interagency group on terrorist 
financing was established, which included the NSC, the Treasury Department, the CIA, the FBI, 
and the State Department.  While the CIA cooperated in this group, the FBI would not 
meaningfully participate.” (Clunan, 2006:  584)   
The reactive AEDPA could not stop an elusive enemy network that funded violent 
attacks on vulnerable U.S. targets through discreet financial channels with no accountability 
procedures.  This lacuna was captured later in the 2004 Commission on the 9-11 Terrorist 
Attacks: “Intelligence agents, long accustomed to the Cold War reality of collecting intelligence 
for extended periods of time before public action was necessary, were now faced with a new 
demand for intelligence that needed not only to be immediately and publicly acted on but to be 
defended in court as well.” (Greenburg, Roth and Wille, 2004: 48)  The NSC retaliation for the 
embassy bombings was still a reaction: a cruise missile strike on Bin Laden's compound in 
Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, (Woodward, 2004: 26, Benjamin, Simon, 
2003: 259-60).  Two years later on October 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was struck with a skiff full of 
explosives while at port in Yemen.  The attackers were identified as al Qaeda affiliated terrorists 
(9/11 Commission Report, 2004: 153).  The U.S. thus faced a unique challenge entering the new 
millennium.  It had experienced terrorism within its borders and saw the rise of stateless 
transnational terrorism.  There was, however, no system in place to distinguish terrorist funding 
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activities from the activities of legitimate non-state entities, including international Islamic 
charities. 
Post-9/11 support to terrorism: 
On September 23, 2001, almost two weeks after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush 
issued EO 13224; Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, 
Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism.  This executive order also invoked the IEEPA to 
declare a national emergency in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  This policy acknowledged 
the challenges in following the elusive terrorist finance trail; “… because of the pervasiveness 
and expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be 
appropriate for those foreign persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign 
terrorists.” An independent task force of the Council on Foreign Relations later identified this 
approach as “following the money” (Greenberg, Factor, Wechsler and Wolosky, 2004: 38)  
 Section 7 of EO 13224 is unique in that it delegates presidential authorities normally found 
under the IEEPA to executive departments of the government; “The Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to take 
such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers 
granted to the President by IEEPA and UNPA (United Nations Participation Act of 1945) as may 
be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may 
redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the United States 
Government.”  Section 7 came into play in the next eight years as the Treasury issued blocking 
orders, sealed or delayed search warrants, and leveled indictments at U.S.-based Islamic 
charities.  This executive order is where the U.S. began branding suspect organizations as 
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Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).   It is a federal offense for a U.S. citizen to 
provide any support to the 27 Muslim organizations identified as SDGTs in EO 13224.   
While its lengthy title is The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, in daily conversation, it’s called the USA 
Patriot Act.   Within 46 days of the 9/11 attacks the U.S. Patriot act was signed.  Louis Gerdes, in 
The Patriot Act: Opposing Viewpoints suggests this Act to be a miracle in modern legislation; 
“The Patriot Act passed in the Senate without debate.  After minor changes were made in the 
House, the complex, 342-page bill passed 357 to 66 and was signed into law on October 26, 
2001” (Gerdes, 220: 14).  The many provisions of this law were intended to make U.S. agencies 
more proactive in preventing terrorism.  Here are key counterterrorism measures within the bill:   
 Budget enhancements for federal agencies and first responders. 
 Expanding the definition of terrorism to include “domestic terrorism”. 
 Expanding the definition of material support to terrorism to include:  “…currency or 
other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safe houses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except 
medicine or religious materials.’’.  (Section 323, 2339[A][b]) 
 Updated surveillance protocols to accelerate warrant procedures and account for current 
and emerging communications technology. 
 Allowance of ‘roving’ wiretaps, which broaden the number of phone accounts and 
devices that can be monitored on an individual. 
 Stronger money laundering control measures. 
 Use of classified evidence, in camera and ex parte (not available to the party under 
investigation) to support official terrorist designations and prosecutions. 
 Federal Agency access to bank records, library activity, and bookstore transactions to 
monitor for suspicious transactions.  
 Conducting searches with ‘delayed’ or sealed warrants. 
 Instituting a bulk cash smuggling offense which requires banks and customs officials to 
report cash quantities of $10,000.00 or greater. 
 
By design, the USA Patriot Act was a more proactive counterterrorist policy than its 
predecessors.  It allowed government agencies (FBI, DEA, ICE, IRS, and U.S. Attorney Offices) 
to collaborate and delve deeper into domestic affairs to stop terrorism.  Under the Patriot Act, the 
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Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) became the lead agency for identifying and 
freezing assets of potential domestic organizations that support terrorism.  OFAC became 
responsible for compiling and managing the government’s terrorist designation list.  OFAC 
started investigations on a suspected organization by building evidentiary packages derived 
from:  “…’all-source’ research that exploits a variety of classified and unclassified information 
sources in order to determine how the activities or relationships of a specific target meet the 
criteria of the EO [president’s executive order]” (Newcomb, Richard, 2004).  Once implemented, 
the Patriot Act formed the cornerstone for post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy.  The U.S. 
government’s first test-run of measures within the Patriot Act would take place 35 days after its 
signing with the forced closure of three charities: Holy Land Foundation (HLF), Global Relief 
Foundation (GRF) and Benevolence International Foundation (BIF). 
Holy Land Foundation (HLF): 
Secretary of the Treasury Department Paul O’Neill issued a press release on December 4, 
2001 announcing the closure of a U.S. based terrorist organization, “The Holy Land Foundation 
(HLF) masquerades as a charity, while its primary purpose is to fund Hamas. This is not a case 
of one bad actor stealing from the petty cash drawer and giving those stolen monies to terrorists.  
This organization exists to raise money in the United States to promote terror.” (Treasury Press 
Release, HLF, 2001).   President George W. Bush issued a similar announcement that morning 
about HLF from the Rose Garden with an official state guest in attendance, “The former 
President's press conference coincided with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the 
White House, and took place the week after three Hamas suicide bombings killed 25 people and 
wounded 200 more.”  (Ratner, 2012: 586)  
On that same day in the middle of the Islamic month of Ramadan, OFAC designated HLF 
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a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization, announcing that all of HLF’s 
assets were blocked pending investigation (BPI).  FBI and Treasury agents raided HLF 
headquarters and the home of its executive: Shukri Abu Baker.  Sally Howell, of the Center for 
Arab American Studies at the University of Michigan, provides a good description of this 
process on a similar Islamic charity raid, “…its records and computers confiscated, its staff and 
donors interrogated, and its bank accounts temporarily frozen.” (Howell, 2010: 4)  A day later, 
the New York Times provided more details of the HLF raid; “Movers using a tractor-trailer 
arrived with the seizure notice at about 8 a.m. and worked into the night.”  (Sanger, Miller, 2001)  
Once billed as the largest Muslim charity in the U.S. (Ratner, 2011: 576) Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) was a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization 
headquartered in Richardson, Texas with branch offices in San Diego, California, Bridgeview, 
Illinois, and Patterson, New Jersey.  HLF originated in California in 1989 under the name 
Occupied Land Fund ("OLF") but relocated to Richardson, TX on September 16, 1991, renaming 
itself Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development.  According to the treasury, HLF 
provided financial support to Hamas-controlled charities in the West Bank and Gaza since 1989.  
Additionally, HLF was accused of funding charities that provided for the families of Hamas 
prisoners and martyrs. (Holy Land v. Ashcroft, 2002)   
Preliminary allegations about HLF stemmed from evidence taken during Israeli security 
raids and Hamas interrogations as well as classified evidence collected by U.S. federal agents.  
The HLF case involved the testimony of undisclosed, sequestered witnesses.  The surveillance 
records used in the indictment (under the warrantless wiretapping program) had been unwittingly 
revealed to HLF defense counsel early in the investigation process.  HLF was eventually granted 
license to access blocked funds to mount a legal defense.  They filed for an injunction against the 
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government, protesting that the blocked assets and the SDGT designation were unconstitutional.  
By the fall of 2008, HLF was on its second trial, where: “…the Department of Justice struggled 
to obtain a guilty verdict in a criminal case against the Holy Land Foundation, winning a 
conviction in a retrial only after the first prosecution ended with a hung jury and allegations of 
government misconduct.”  (Sandberg-Zakian, 2011: 103)   
A civil suit brought against HLF by the parents of deceased Israeli student David Boim 
further compounded HLF’s case.  Boim, a dual citizen of Israel and the United States was 
murdered five years before the HLF closure on May 13, 1996 by a Hamas gunman in the West 
Bank.  The Boim family charged HLF with aiding and abetting Hamas in their son’s murder.  On 
this issue, the charity was never sentenced, and the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court remanded on the 
possibility of HLF’s liability for Boim’s death.  The process of shutting down and defaming 
Holy Land Foundation set the template for a “designations-and-asset-freezing approach” 
(Clunan, 2006: 592) to closing U.S. based charities.  This approach would be repeated seven 
more times between 2001 and now.   In the same month that HLF was shut down, U.S. law 
enforcement agencies also shut down the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) 
Global Relief Foundation (GRF): 
Global Relief Foundation (GRF) was a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization incorporated in 
Bridgeview, Illinois in 1992.  GRF’s charter was to conduct humanitarian relief operations 
worldwide.  On December 14, 2001, towards the end of the holy month of Ramadan, the 
charity’s assets were frozen “pursuant to an OFAC blocking order pending investigation” 
(ACLU, 2009: 52) for suspected associations with al Qaeda.  FBI agents conducted a warrantless 
search of the GRF office in Bridgeview and the home of its co-founder, Lebanese-born Rabih 
Haddad confiscating business records, money, computers, and anything that could aid in an 
  
 
31 
 
investigation. (GRF v. O’Neill, Powell, Ashcroft, Newcomb & Mueller, 2001)  Haddad was of 
particular interest to authorities because of his former charity work in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  Haddad was immediately detained by Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS) for overstaying his tourist visa.  After three closed hearings, INS determined 
Haddad’s immigration status: “Haddad was held in solitary confinement in immigration 
detention, and was finally deported after 19 months of detention.”  (ACLU, 2009: 52) 
The Treasury alleged that Haddad belonged to Makhtab Al-Khidamat, the precursor to al 
Qaida in the early 1990s.  GRF was accused of dealing with the Taliban in the fall of 2001 in 
addition to having had correspondence with terrorists linked to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings 
in Kenya and Tanzania.  Accusations included providing assistance to Hizbul Mujāhidīn in the 
Kashmir region and receiving funds from another designated global terrorist organization, the 
aforementioned Holy Land Foundation. (U.S. Treasury Press Release, AHIF, 2002)  In 
November 2001 GRF filed a defamation suit against several news agencies for publicizing the 
Treasury’s press release.   
The GRF proceeded to file injunctions that challenged the constitutionality of the blocked 
assets, seizures, and designation as a terrorist organization.  The GRF defense challenged Ex 
Post Facto Clause (ascribing guilt for past acts before they were made unlawful) aspects of the 
federal investigation, specifically; How could GRF’s affiliations be criminal if they pre-dated the 
U.S.’s terrorist designation list?  The charity also challenged the use of classified government 
evidence.  U.S. court eventually overturned all GRF injunctions in favor of the government, but 
the charity was granted license to access blocked funds to pay for legal defense. (GRF v. O’Neill 
et al., 2002)  OFAC designated GRF a SDGT almost a year after the Treasury’s blocking action 
even though no terrorist charges were ever established.  GRF has not resumed charitable 
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operations since December 2011 due to frozen financial resources and defamation of 
professional reputation.  For all practical purposes, GRF is a defunct charitable organization. 
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF): 
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) was shut down simultaneously with the 
Global Relief Foundation.  BIF was a Saudi-based charity created in the 1980s, with offices in 
ten other countries.  The U.S. branch of BIF was incorporated in March 1992, with a main office 
in Palos Hills, southwest Chicago and another in New Jersey. This charity was a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organization with a mission to provide for “humanitarian relief projects throughout the 
world”. (Treasury Press Release, BIF, 2002)  The charity’s director, Syrian-born Enaam Arnaout 
had long been suspected by the CIA to have close ties with Osama bin Laden dating back to the 
Soviet-Afghan conflict (Lichtblau, Eric, NY Times, 2002).  Arnaout used the aliases ‘Abdel 
Samia and Abu Mahmoud during charity work overseas.  These same aliases were linked to 
incriminating documents confiscated from BIF offices in Bosnia.  
On 14 December 2001 OFAC notified BIF that all of its assets were blocked pending 
investigation (BPI) for possible terrorist affiliations.  Federal agents immediately conducted the 
all-too-familiar search and seizure of Arnaout’s residence and BIF properties.  On 26 March 
2002, BIF filed a civil suit against the U.S. Treasury and the Department of Justice with a motion 
to reverse the blocking action.  The charity’s lawyers contested the use of classified evidence, 
sequestered witnesses, hearsay, and premature release of photographs to the media.  The charity 
was designated a SDGT almost a year later in November 2002.  Federal prosecutors charged 
Arnaout with a seven-count indictment convinced that BIF: “...was a financial front for Osama 
bin Laden's terrorist activities.”  (Lichtblau, 2002)  Allegations against Arnaout included 
consorting with bin Laden and Afghan Warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as well as providing 
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funds to support the 1998 Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  The government also 
alleged that BIF funds were used to support “… Muslim rebels in the separatist Russian region of 
Chechnya.” (Cohen, 2002)   Government evidence included photographs taken from the Soviet-
Afghan conflict in the 1980s.  These pictures showed Arnaout posing with Afghan Mujāhidīn 
and walking alongside with Osama bin Laden.   
Arnaout accepted a plea bargain agreement but U.S. prosecutors did not get the terrorist 
conviction they were looking for.  On August 18, 2003 he was sentenced to eleven years in 
prison for racketeering.  The federal case against BIF revealed shortcomings in U.S. 
counterterrorist strategy: “But the ambiguous outcome of the case, which left both sides claiming 
victory, underscored the difficulties that federal prosecutors faced in trying to establish clear 
financial links between terrorists and their suspected backers in the United States.”(Charity 
Leader, NY Times, 2003)  As with GRF, all charges of terrorism support were dropped.  BIF 
suffered the same defamation and blocked finances, making it defunct as well.  
The first nine months of the war on terrorism brought hard lessons within the U.S. 
domestic counterterrorism program.  Prosecutors were hard pressed to gain a terrorist conviction 
solely relying on a ‘guilt by association’ approach as summarized by former New York attorneys 
Richard Zabel and James Benjamin: “Thus, without direct evidence of the defendant’s 
knowledge that his fundraising is intended to benefit a designated terrorist organization, such as 
an audiotape, it can be difficult for prosecutors to present a compelling case, especially if the 
prosecution relies solely on confusing financial records of contributions to an organization that in 
part is dedicated to bona fide humanitarian relief efforts.” (Zabel & Benjamin, 3008: 37).   
An attempt to address this challenge was put forward in The Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002.  Ratified on June 25, 2002, this 
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act expanded liability for terrorist support in the event a person aids terrorism:  “…by any means, 
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully provides or collects funds with the intention that 
such funds be used, or with the knowledge that such funds are used in full or in part, in order to 
carry out-“.  (Public Law 107-197, 2002; Sec 201)  From here, Section 201 proceeds to list 
various terrorist acts, but the approach is clear; if intent to support can be proven then so can 
guilt. 
Public opinion and media at the time did not look favorably on the U.S. government’s 
heavy-handed approach.  Other U.S.-based Islamic charities were searched and investigated by 
the government without incident, but public attention was focused on the three charities 
described above.  The government’s own 2004 commission on terrorist financing provided 
comment on this heavy-handed approach: “The government is able to (and has, on at least three 
occasions) shut down U.S. entities without developing even the administrative record necessary 
for a designation. Such action requires only the signature of a midlevel government official…But 
when the interim blocking lasts 10 or 11 months, as it did in the Illinois charities cases…real 
issues of administrative due process and fundamental fairness arise.” (Greenburg, Roth, 
Wille, 2004: 51)  At question to many Muslim Americans was how to honor charitable 
obligations of zakāt and ṣadaqah without appearing guilty in the broader public domain.  The 
community of U.S.-based Islamic charities engaged the Department of Treasury, compelling the 
publication of the 2002 Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Practices for U.S.-Based 
Charities.  These guidelines publication provided broad, common sense approaches to soliciting, 
receiving, managing, and dispersing charitable contributions within nonprofit organizations.  It 
also described the steps necessary to remain in compliance with counterterrorism law, however, 
it did not reveal anything profound that credible charities were not already practicing. 
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A 2004 independent task force report by the Council on Foreign Relations highlighted the 
near impossible challenge of linking stateside charity with overseas terrorist activities. “…U.S. 
efforts to combat terrorist financing had yet to accomplish the basic mission of stopping the flow 
of money to terror groups.  The U.S. General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, concluded that federal authorities still did not have a clear understanding of how 
terrorists move their financial assets and continue to struggle to halt terrorist funding.” 
(Greenberg, Factor, Wechsler, Wolosky, 2004: 6)  Even so, this task force recommended that the 
Treasury continue investing terrorist financial networks through current practices and sustain the 
practice of designating SDGTs.   
The 9/11 Commission Report (July 2004) was another government effort to analyze the 
9/11 terrorist attacks as well as the effectiveness of the USA Patriot Act.  It recommended many 
procedural changes across federal agencies to better prosecute the War on Terrorism (9-
11commission.gov).  Although the White House viewed this report with skepticism, some of the 
commission’s recommendations would end up in U.S. legislation: “Reading the tea leaves, the 
Bush Administration reversed course and indicated its willingness to consider legislation that 
would implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations.  Congress passed the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRPTA), and President Bush signed it into law on 
December 17, 2004, just a few weeks after winning a second term.” (Negroponte, Wittenstein, 
2010: 387)   
The IRPTA directed administrative changes across the U.S. intelligence community 
(approximately 17 agencies) to bring reporting, information sharing, and accountability under 
one office; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).  On the topic of material 
support to terrorism, this law made negligible changes to the definitions of material resources, 
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terrorist training, and providing expert assistance.  The noticeable change with IRPTA is that it 
criminalized the act of giving charity when a donor has: “knowledge that the organization is a 
designated terrorist organization…, that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist 
activity …, or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism...” (Public Law 108-458, 
2004, Sec 66303).  Armed with this tool, the Justice Department and Department of Treasury 
proceeded to investigate four more U.S.-based Islamic charities: 
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) 
Saudi Arabian-based Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) was a 501(c) (3) non-
profit public benefit corporation established in Ashland Oregon in 1999.   With over a dozen 
offices worldwide, AHIF had an outreach mission to: “‘…promote greater understanding of the 
Islamic religion through operating prayer houses, distributing religious publications, and 
engaging in other charitable activities.’” (Al-Haramain v. Treasury, 2011). 
On February 18, 2004, U.S. Treasury and FBI agents raided the Oregon AHIF office.  
Simultaneously, OFAC blocked all of the charity’s assets pending investigation (BPI): 
“Consistent with its general practice, OFAC did not provide AHIF Oregon prior notice or obtain 
a warrant before blocking its assets.” (Brez, Casey, 2012: 1)   By June 9, 2004, all AHIF offices 
worldwide were designated a SDGT on the suspicion of funding organizations on the U.S. 
terrorist list including:  “…Jemmah Islammiya, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya, Egyptian Islamic Jihād, 
Hamas, and Lashkar E-Taibah..” (Greenberg, Factor, Wechsler, Wolosky, 2004:  18)  The 
charity’s director, Iranian-born Pirouz Sedaghaty, was accused of supporting al-Qaeda, money 
laundering, funding Islamic fighters in Chechnya and Somalia, smuggling money to Saudi 
Arabia and violating U.S. Tax laws.  Stuart Levy, the Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence charged AHIF in a press release that same day:  “Al Haramain has 
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been used around the world to underwrite terror, therefore we have taken this action to 
excommunicate these two branches and Suliman Al-Buthe (the Saudi AHIF director) from the 
worldwide financial community" (U.S. Treasury Press Release, AHIF 2004).  
AHIF appealed for removal of the terrorist designation and sought license to use blocked 
assets for a legal defense.  The Treasury did not respond to AHIF appeals until completing its 
investigation four years later; on June 19, 2008, AHIF was re-designated an SDGT.   The charity 
countered with a suit that protested warrantless government surveillance: “First, prosecutors 
accidentally revealed to the al-Haramain Foundation that phone conversations between the 
charity’s Saudi Arabia-based director and its American citizen lawyers in Washington, D.C. had 
been taped as part of the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program.” (Sandberg-Zakian, 2011: 
103)  AHIF filed an injunction declaring the blocked assets and SDGT designation to be 
unconstitutional.  AHIF accused OFAC of sloppy due process of law that included mishandled 
classified materials, unwarranted surveillance, and paid FBI informants. Although no links to 
financing terrorism were ever substantiated, AHIF became defunct due to frozen assets and 
public stigma.  In February 2012 the director of AHIF, Sedaghaty was found guilty of money 
laundering and tax fraud. (Freeman, 2012) 
Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) 
Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) was a nonprofit charity headquartered in 
Columbia, Missouri.  The organization was founded in 1985, and up until May 2000 The IARA 
went by the name Islamic African Relief Agency (Similar to a different charity in Khartoum, 
Sudan with alleged terrorist ties).  The charity’s mission was to provide:  "…charitable and 
humanitarian aid to refugees, orphans, victims of human and natural disasters, and other poor 
and needy persons and entities throughout the world, without regard to faith or political 
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affiliation." (IARA v. FBI Agent, 2005: 12).   IARA was designated a SDGT by OFAC on 13 
October 2004, just days before the start of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.  Its offices were 
shut down that same day and all assets were blocked pending investigation (BPI).  
The government suspected that IARA had affiliations with the above mentioned African 
Relief Agency in Sudan.  Federal agents (using a sealed warrant) raided the IARA office and the 
home of its president, Sudanese-born Mubarak Hamed.  With the IARA’s case, the FBI deemed 
it necessary to preserve the element of surprise:  “prompt action by the Government was 
necessary to protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.  Money is 
fungible, and any delay or pre-blocking notice would afford a designated entity the opportunity 
to transfer, spend, or conceal its assets...” (IARA v. FBI Agent, 2005: 21) After further 
investigation, Federal prosecutors charged Hamed and the three IARA board members with a 33-
count indictment in March of 2007.  The IARA was accused of using its tax-exempt status to 
raise and illegally transfer money to Iraq from 1991 to 2003 in violation of Iraqi sanctions.  
Other indictments included money laundering, unlawful use of USAID relief money, theft of 
public funds, alleged support to al Qaida, use of tax-exempt funds for personal expenses and 
submitting false testimony. (DOJ Press Release, IARA, 2007) 
The IARA case involved the criminal trial of former Michigan Congressman Mark 
Siljander (R), found guilty of: “obstruction of justice and for acting as an unregistered foreign 
agent, related to his work for an Islamic charity with ties to international terrorism.” (DOJ Press 
Release, IARA, 2012)  Siljander admitted to receiving payments to help get IARA removed from 
a Senate Finance Committee terrorist list.  IARA filed an appeal, challenging the 
constitutionality of the OFAC blocking and the SDGT designation.  The charity contended that 
IARA USA was not a branch of IARA Sudan and that classified evidence had been used in the 
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federal indictment.  All appeals were overturned and in June of 2010, Hamed and the three board 
members were convicted of conspiracy to illegally transfer funds to Iraq in violation of federal 
sanctions.  The court could not, however, substantiate charges of terrorist support.  Like the 
previously listed charities, IARA is no longer in operation.  Former Congressman Siljander was 
sentenced to a year in federal prison for “…obstruction of justice and for acting as an 
unregistered foreign agent.” (DOJ Press Release, Jan 11, 2012) 
KindHearts of Toledo:   
Kindhearts, an Islamic faith-based nonprofit corporation in Toledo Ohio was 
incorporated in January 2002 by Khaled Smaili, former head of the two aforementioned 
charities; the Global Relief Foundation (GRF) and the Holy Land Foundation (HLF).  Similar to 
GRF and HLF, Kindheart’s mission was to: “… provide humanitarian aid without regard to 
religious or political affiliation.” (Kindhearts v. U.S. 2009: 45)  On February 19, 2006, federal 
agents conducted a warrantless raid of Kindhearts offices and the residence of Khaled Smaili.  
Simultaneously, Kindhearts assets were blocked pending investigation (BPI) based on 
incriminating “…information developed from abroad”. (Treasury Press Release, Kindhearts, 
2006) The U.S. Treasury alleged that Kindhearts subsumed the fundraising efforts of the closed 
HLF and GRF charities in order to provide support to Hamas organizations and Salafist groups 
in Lebanon.  The charity filed a countersuit challenging the constitutionality of the blocking 
action, use of classified evidence, and the inability to use blocked funds to pay for a legal 
defense.  After a year of investigation and multiple, unanswered legal inquiries from Kindhearts, 
OFAC eventually designated the charity a SDGT on May 25, 2007.  Upon SDGT designation, 
Kindhearts received license to use blocked funds and the organization’s attorneys were given 
access to in camera and ex parte evidence for legal defense.  Although links to terrorism were 
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never substantiated, Kindhearts ceased to function as a charity since its blocking in February 
2006. 
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 proved effective in terms of freezing the charitable funds of 
U.S.-based Islamic charities.  It was, however, stopgap legislation, and had an expiration date (In 
congressional legalese; Sunset Date) of December 2005.  Legislative efforts had been underway 
since 2001 to pass an enduring version of the Patriot Act.  On March 2, 2006, the president 
signed into law The USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Public Law 
109–177 (Referred to as Patriot Act II).  The government still viewed this law as essential to the 
War on Terrorism: “This legislation reauthorizes all expiring provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 
adds dozens of additional safeguards to protect Americans' privacy and civil liberties, 
strengthens port security, and provides tools to combat the spread of methamphetamine.”  (DOJ 
Fact sheet: Patriot Act II)  In addition to preserving counterterrorism measures from the original 
Patriot Act, the 2005 law added 
 Expanded money laundering measures to include Hawalers and informal money networks 
 Mandated a process of ‘minimization’ to reign in rampant evidence collecting by federal 
investigators and permit suspect US citizens a chance for legal defense.  According to 
Patriot Act II, minimization is: “…procedures that are reasonably designed in light of the 
purpose and technique of an order for the production of tangible things, to minimize the 
retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of non-publicly available information 
concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United 
States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;” (Public Law 
109-177, Sec 106 [g] [2] [A]) 
 Delayed notice search warrants – Tantamount to unannounced searches, this authorizes 
investigators to delay release of a search notice up to 30 days after a search should 
circumstances dictate.  If ‘good cause’ can be shown, courts can delay release of a search 
warrant for multiple 90-day periods. (Public Law 109-177, Sec 114)  
 
Goodwill Charitable Organization (GCO) 
The last Islamic charity shut down during the Bush Administration was The Goodwill 
Charitable Organization (GCO).  GCO was a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization headquartered in 
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Dearborn, Michigan, a city with: “the nation's largest concentration of Arab-Americans”, 
(Karush, 2006).  The U.S. Treasury had cause to believe that GCO was: “…a Hizballah front 
organization that reports directly to the leadership of the Martyrs Foundation in Lebanon.” 
(GCO, www.treasury.gov)  The Martyrs Foundation had long been suspected of incentivizing 
terrorism and providing money to families of suicide bombers. (Perry, Suzanne, Chronicle, 2007)  
On July 24, 2007, FBI agents searched GCO offices while the US Treasury blocked all GCO 
Assets, pending investigation.   Immediately after the raid, FBI agents hosted an informational 
meeting with Muslim leaders in the Dearborn community to alleviate community concerns.  
Although no criminal charges were filed, GCO is still on the U.S. Treasury’s SDGT list and it 
remains shut down indefinitely. 
Conclusion: 
Since 1977, the U.S. government has issued twelve major policy changes in the form of 
legislature, executive orders, and federal publications that are designed to combat “Terrorist 
exploitation of the charitable sector” (U.S. Treasury Protecting Charitable Giving, FAQ, 2010).  
The Bush Administration has shut down a total of seven U.S.-based Islamic charities since 9/11.  
These closures do not include the six U.S.-based Islamic charities that have been subject to 
intrusive federal investigations: “…KinderUSA (Texas), Life for Relief and Development 
(Michigan), Al-Mabarrat (Michigan), Child Foundation (Oregon), Help the Needy (New York), 
and Care International (Massachusetts) have been declared under investigation or raided.”  
(ACLU, 2009: 12)  The Obama administration to the date of writing has not shut down any 
Islamic charities; however, it did close down the Maryland-based Tamil Foundation, designating 
it an SDGT on February 11, 2009 for alleged ties to the terrorist organization Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (treasury.gov).  
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In fact, the U.S. government has continued the practice of “Naming and shaming” 
(Clunan, 2006: 577) well beyond President Obama’s first term: “As of December 31, 2012, a 
total of 731 individuals and entities had been designated and remained listed as “Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists” or “SDGTs”…” (Terrorist Asset Report [TAR], 2012: 5)  This 
number of SDGTs reflects an increase by 105 from the previous year (The largest since the 
SDGT list started in 2001).  The table below summarizes the evolution of U.S. antiterrorism 
financing policies since the Cold War juxtaposed with eight U.S.-based charities shut down by 
OFAC.  This figure served as a discussional tool for field research and is further analyzed in 
chapter three of this paper: 
! 18 Feb 2004: Al-Haramain 
Islamic Foundation (OR) shut 
down by OFAC, designated SDGT 
on 9 Jun, 2004. 
! 14 Dec 2001: Benevolence Intl 
Foundation (NJ) shut down by 
OFAC, designated SDGT Nov 
2002. 
! 19 Feb 2006: KindHearts for 
Charitable Humanitarian 
Development Inc (OH) shut down 
by OFAC, designated SDGT 25 
May 2007. 
! 24 Jul 2007: Goodwill 
Charitable Organization (MI) 
shut down by OFAC, 
designated SDGT.  
! 13 Oct 2004: Islamic 
American Relief Agency (MO) 
Designated shut down by 
OFAC, designated SDGT. 
! 1 Dec 2001: Holy Land 
Foundation  (TX) shut down by 
OFAC, designated SDGT 
! 11 Feb, 2009: Tamil foundation 
(MD) shut down by OFAC, 
designated SDGT 
! 14 Dec 2001: Global Relief 
Foundation (IL) shut down by 
OFAC, designated SDGT  
!  
1996 
2001 
2003 
2000 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2008 
2007 
2009 
1995 
1997 
1998 
1999 
!  Jan 23, 1995: 
Executive Order 12947, Specially 
Designated Terrorists (SDT) 
Apr 24, 1996: 
Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of1996 – Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) 
!  
!  Aug 20, 1998:  
Executive Order 13099 – Revises 
terrorist list to include Osama bin 
Laden 
Sep 23, 2001:  
Executive Order 13224 –Prohibits 
transactions with terrorists.  
Publishes Specially Designated 
Global Terrorists (SDGTs) 
 
!  
Oct 26, 2001:  
USA Patriot Act – Increased 
federal authority in GWOT 
!  
Nov 2002:  
US Treasury s Anti- Terrorist 
Financing Guidelines: Voluntary 
Practices for U.S.-Based Charities 
!  Dec 17, 2004: 
Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act 
2 Mar 2006:  
USA Patriot Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act 
(Partiot Act II) 
!  
Evolution of U.S. Policy Closure of 
Islamic Charities in the U.S. 
Year 
Jun 25, 2002: 
Suppression of Financing 
Terrorism Convention 
Implementation Act 
!  
 
Figure 2: Timeline of U.S. antiterrorism funding policy and closed U.S.-based charities 
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U.S. antiterrorism policy has shifted from Cold War, executive level solutions (sanctions, 
retaliatory strikes, etc.) aimed at state sponsors to a decentralized agency-level counterterrorism 
program focused on domestic non-state organizations and individuals.  Conversely, Islamic 
charities have evolved from rudimentary, state-sponsored entities into credible, transnational, 
non-state organizations that preserve a long-standing culture of Islamic philanthropy: “There is 
certainly merit in showing respect for a great, often neglected non-western religious and cultural 
tradition, with the aim of persuading Muslims that they ‘own’ International Humanitarian Law as 
much as Westerners do.” (Benthall, 2003: 57)   
Since 2001, OFAC has cited blocked charitable funds each year as a measure of success 
in the U.S. counterterrorism program in its annual Terrorist Asset Report (TAR).  As of the 2012 
TAR, the treasury could boast: “…approximately $2.3 billion in assets is blocked pursuant to 
economic sanctions imposed by the United States and administered by OFAC.” (TAR, 2012: 2)  
The enhanced powers of surveillance, seizure and prosecution decentralized to lower agencies 
have strengthened the government’s ability to scrutinize for possible domestic support to 
terrorism.  Concurrently, media coverage has raised concerns that these powers run contrary to 
U.S. Bill of Rights: “By passing the Patriot Act last November, Bush and his compliant Congress 
have suppressed or abrogated or abridged whole sections of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth 
Amendments, …”(Said, 2010: 155) 
So far, the major points of friction between Islamic charities and U.S. counterterrorism 
mentioned in this chapter have generally been on the coasts or borders of the continental United 
States (New York, Michigan, Oregon, Texas, Chicago and Massachusetts).  The Greater Kansas 
City area, which has a sizeable Muslim American population, appears to be surrounded by, but 
isolated from these events.  Kansas City is cited as having the 98
th
 largest Muslim population out 
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of 133 U.S. metropolitan centers. (Thearda.com)  Surprisingly, however, Kansas City seems to 
be free of these friction points, a phenomenon that continues to drive the question: How do 
Muslim Americans in the Greater Kansas City Area view U.S. counterterrorism policies that 
securitize the nonprofit sector and stigmatize charitable giving?  The next chapter will reveal 
research trends that lend insight to answering this question. 
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Chapter 2 
Trends in Kansas City’s Islamic Philanthropy 
The previous chapter revealed anxiety within two sectors of American society:  The U.S. 
Government obsession with national security and Muslim American anxiety over religious 
freedom and free association.  This chapter shows the results of data collection and field research 
within Kansas City’s Muslim American community.  It provides trends and observations taken 
from an analysis of twelve nonprofit organization’s tax records plus small group discussions with 
fourteen Muslim American volunteers.  This research was driven by a single line of inquiry 
regarding Kansas City Muslim Americans:  Did post-9/11 counterterrorism policies alter their 
charitable practices (zakāt and ṣadaqah) and do they perceive their civil rights to be at risk?  The 
first hurdle in pursuing this thesis research was gaining access into this community  
A degree of insularity: 
Interaction with Kansas City Muslim Americans revealed a degree of insularity that made 
it a challenge to find volunteers and budgets for charitable organizations.  One good example of 
such insularity is an office call that I had made to a mosque director in early October 2012.  After 
giving a 30-minute research presentation and answering several pointed questions, I asked this 
director if he would give consent for his mosque’s participation.  This director did not agree to 
participate, nor did he disagree.  Rather, he explained that he did not think this research applied 
to the patrons of his mosque.  Notwithstanding, the director felt the topic was important to 
Kansas City and he agreed to provide research references and contacts.  Determined not to walk 
away empty-handed, I presented other compelling reasons why this research was relevant to his 
mosque.  Again, he restated that his community was probably not the audience I required.  I 
asked for clarification; was he declining to participate in this study?  This director simply 
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restated that he saw no research benefit coming from his mosque.   The obtuse response lacked 
finality; I could not determine if he declined to participate or was looking for a stronger 
argument. After our meeting, I continued to include this director in all ‘networking’ emails 
related to my research; however, I have not heard from him since.  
Similarly, I sought to recruit the coordinator of a major Islamic charity in southern 
Kansas City.  What started as phone calls and emails in early summer of 2012 proceeded to a 
face-to-face introduction at a September 2012 charity banquet.  I made repeated attempts to pitch 
my research, but this coordinator remained aloof.   In mid-October I located him at a Muslim 
outreach seminar at the Islamic Society of the Greater Kansas City (ISGKC).  This outreach 
(da’wah) was a response to the recent controversy over a July 2012 Internet video that mocked 
the prophet Muhammad: “The Innocence of Muslims” (Kovalesky, Barnes, 2012).  The purpose 
of the seminar was to address public misconceptions of Islam and highlight the Prophet 
Muhammad’s benevolent nature.  After the seminar I solicited this coordinator one last time to 
participate in my research: 
Me: “I would love to get on your schedule to show you my research efforts.” 
Coordinator: “Yes, of course.  So, you are a Muslim right?” 
Me: “No sir I’m a Christian.  But I told you this from when we first met.”  
Coordinator: (Smiling, looking off in the distance) “Well my office is too busy; we don’t 
have time for this research.  But I can answer any questions you have about Islam. 
Me: (dumbstruck) “Uh…no…but thank you (name struck) for your time.”  
 
While these responses could be viewed as evasive, I believe they are a natural degree of caution 
endemic to the Muslim American community.   Several Muslims I had encountered asked 
specifically why I chose to conduct this research; what did I hope to achieve with my studies?   
One individual went so far as to protest, “You are not even Muslim!”   
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There are several legitimate explanations for this perceived insularity and ambivalence.  
First and foremost, opinion polls, surveys and research studies can be intrusive and annoying. 
Second, efforts to gather names, contact information and personal opinions might be perceived 
as intelligence collection against members of the community.  Lastly, Muslim Americans are 
hard-working, tax-paying citizens: showing up to conduct a survey can be perceived as a direct 
challenge to one’s Muslim identity and citizenship.  The 2011 anthology Arab Detroit 9/11: Life 
in the Terror Decade, provides a possible explanation for the Muslim frustration with research 
inquiries: “What is unexpected, however is the odd way in which every attempt to assert 
American identity must involve a simultaneous stigmatization of any sense of Arab identity that 
includes a strong identification with religious beliefs, political ideologies, and cultural practices 
that are genuinely alternative to those prevalent in America today.  To reassert their status as 
‘good’ and ‘loyal’ and worthy of respect, Arab Americans must distance themselves not only 
from negative stereotypes, but also from the people who are most likely to suffer from these 
images and their consequences.” (Abraham, Howell, Shryock, 2011: 9)  Given this barrier, I 
proceeded with data collection and field research that did not necessitate personal interviews or 
surveys.  
Charitable Budget Comparisons 
The first part of this research was a comparison of the charitable budgets of Islamic 
organizations in the Greater Kansas City Area with an aim to determine if post 9/11 policies had 
adversely impacted donation patterns over the past five to ten years.  It quickly became apparent 
that organizations, as with individual interviewees were reticent to provide budget information; 
of the three mosque directors solicited in Southeast Kansas City, each declined to share this 
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information.  Consequently, this research effort relied on data mining income tax information for 
organizations that are 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations.   
The IRS defines a 501(c)(3) organization as: “...tax- exempt organizations such as 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, educational, amateur athletic organizations, and testing 
for public safety.” (IRS Pub 557, 2011: 23)  The IRS Form 990 is specifically designed to report 
the annual budgets for nonprofit organizations.  The tax records used for this research were 
accessed through the online database mentioned in chapter 1: www.irs.gov/Charities.  The 
current standing of all twelve 501(c)(3) organizations was corroborated through other credible 
websites (www.guidestar.org, charityblossom.org, and nonprofitfacts.com).  The form 990s 
provide useful information about an organization to include address, contact information, 
nonprofit mission, board members, Employer Identification Number (EIN) and nonprofit 
category (referred to as National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities [NTEE]).  
When filed correctly, the Form 990 can also provide a five-year snapshot of an 
organization’s annual budget.  In particular, Schedule A, Part III of this form lists those “Gifts, 
grants, contributions, and membership fees received”.  A call to the IRS office in November 
2012 revealed that this is where one would find charitable funds.  To illustrate the point, an 
extract is provided below that shows a charity’s funds from 2006 to 2010: 
 
Figure 3:  Extract from Schedule A, IRS Form 990 (guidestar.org/FinDocuments) 
 
Another challenge encountered in open source research was finding records that showed 
successive tax data from 2001 to present.  Initial data mining yielded IRS Form 990s for eleven 
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Islamic faith-based organizations in the Greater Kansas City Area.  There were, however, no tax 
returns that predated 2003, and three of these were newly formed nonprofit organizations with 
only two years’ of tax returns.  Moreover, two ‘mature’ organizations only had Form 990s for 
two consecutive years. With these limitations, I narrowed my list down to six Kansas City 
Islamic organizations with income tax data that covered a four to seven year period.   
Budgetary analysis necessitated a comparison of these organizations to similar non-
Muslim organizations in order to highlight similarities and disparities.  Accordingly, I sought to 
pair each of the six Muslim charities with the records of six similar non-Muslim organizations 
(religious or secular) with a close match in zip code, NTEE category and charitable mission.  
This was an attempt to ensure contrasted organizations were subject to comparable economic and 
social factors.    I believe that if U.S. policies and closed charities discouraged Islamic 
philanthropy, then one might witness adverse trends with Muslim charities and more favorable 
trends with non-Muslim organizations.  Identifying non-Muslim organizations revealed same 
challenges encountered in locating successive and complete tax records for Muslim 
organizations.  The six non-Muslim organizations identified are similar, but not identical to their 
Islamic counterparts.  In most (but not all) cases, there is a match in type, (e.g. place of worship, 
Ethnic and immigration services or civil rights advocacy).  In most (but not all) cases there is an 
exact match in zip code.  These six pairings are the closest and optimal match given the limited 
tax data available to the public.  A spreadsheet of all twelve nonprofit organizations is depicted 
below, showing Employer Identification Number (EIN), name, zip code, NTEE category, and 
charitable budgets for available fiscal years.  Charities are also paired together in this table for 
comparison and analysis (e.g. the Somali Bantu Foundation of Kansas is listed above the 
Strawberry Hill Ethnic and Cultural Society).  The earliest income tax return on this spreadsheet 
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dates back to 2003, with the Muslim American Society in Overland Park, Kansas.  Conversely, 
two Islamic organizations and four non-Muslim organizations have tax data as recent as fiscal 
year 2011.   There are also external factors beyond this research that likely affect the flow of 
philanthropic contributions from year to year (closed charities, natural disasters, and 
unemployment rates [bls.gov]).  An effort has been made to depict these factors in all budget 
tables and charts for the reader’s reference.  These factors will be discussed later in Chapter 3: 
Analysis. 
 
Table 1: Annual charitable budgets for Kansas City Charities    
 
To gain a visual comparison between Islamic and non-Islamic organizations, these 
pairings are plotted side by side on line graphs depicted in Appendix B-1 through B-6.  It must 
  
 
51 
 
be noted that the scales on each Y-axis are different in order to accentuate differences in 
budgetary organizational performance.  In other words, some charities manage budgets in 
thousands of dollars, others in millions.  The research technique used is not comprehensive, nor 
entirely conclusive and there are some erratic peaks and valleys in the data points from year to 
year.  When viewed from a half-decade perspective, however, (2005 to 2011) this research 
presents some encouraging observations about Kansas City’s Islamic organizations:  
 Four of the six Islamic organizations had a marked increase in revenue from 2006 to 
2010 ranging from a 15% to a 61%. (Appendices B-1, B-2, B-5 and B-6) 
 Two Islamic organizations had growth patterns similar with their non-Muslim counterpart 
(e.g. The Somali Foundation grew over 170% from 2004 to 2010, while the Don Bosco 
Centers grew 14% in that same period) (Appendices B-5 and B-6) 
 The Somali Bantu Foundation took a divergent path from its non-Muslim counterpart, 
growing 44% from 2007 to 2010.  In that same period, its counterpart, The Strawberry 
Hill Ethnic and Cultural Society (nondenominational organization) experienced a 34% 
loss. (Appendix B-1)  A similar divergent pattern occurred between the Muslim 
American Society and the National Fellowship of Catholic Men in Overland Park, 
Kansas.  The former grew by 61% from 2006 to 2009 while the latter shrank by 42%. 
(Appendix B-2) 
 The 10% decrease in revenue experienced by the Islamic School of Greater Kansas City 
from 2007 to 2010 coincides with Stonecroft Ministries 40% decline in revenue during 
that same period. (Appendix B-3) 
 Of all data sets, the Islamic Women’s Society of Greater Kansas City appears to be an 
anomaly. (Appendix B-4)  Tax records suggest that it started with a $36,800.00 grant in 
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2005, 90% of which was expended by the organization within the first year.  After 2005, 
all income for the Women’s Society appears to be generated from “…admissions, 
merchandise sold or performed, or facilities furnished in any activity that is related to the 
organization’s tax-exempt purpose.”  (guidestar.org/FinDocuments).  Oddly enough, the 
budget for the Women’s Society behaved similarly to its non-Muslim counterpart, The 
Jackson County Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA).  From 2006 to 2008, both 
the Women’s Society and CASA experienced budget losses of 71% and 16%, 
respectively.  Conversely, from 2008 to 2010, both experienced budget growth by 250% 
and 45%, respectively. 
Given observations from the available income tax data, it appears that Islamic faith-based 
organizations in Kansas City generally performed as well as their non-Muslim counterpart 
organizations in the decade following 9/11.  In some cases, Muslim charities performed better.  If 
there was an atmosphere of anxiety in Kansas City resulting from U.S. counterterrorism policies 
or anti-Muslim sentiment, it did not seem to affect these six charities.  Even so, these 
observations are far from comprehensive.  The six Muslim organizations described above reflect 
only 22% of the 28 Islamic organizations identified in Chapter 1.  Furthermore, there is no 
reliable way of gaging how much of each organization’s “gifts, grants, contributions, and 
membership fees”, constituted genuine charitable donations.  Further analysis of these budget 
observations and external socioeconomic factors will have to be discussed in the next chapter. 
Focus Group Discussions:   
The goal of this field research was to facilitate focus group discussions comprised of one 
to five individuals in size and using broad questions to gage Kansas City Muslim’s perceptions, 
specifically: 
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1. Awareness of U.S. antiterrorism funding policies 
2. Knowledge of U.S.-based Islamic charities that had been shut down. 
2.  Any perceived risks to civil rights. 
3.  Any noticeable impact to charitable practices over the last 10 years.   
 
Trends and observations obtained from focus group discussions lend insight into the thesis topic: 
Did post-9/11 policies and national media attention impact Islamic charitable practices in Kansas 
City? 
I initially sought to conduct focus group discussions over other verbal measures as they 
encourage a greater degree of interaction.  This conviction is stressed by Adil Najam in his 
philanthropic research:  “…participants were able to discuss the issues related to diaspora 
philanthropy in more general terms, could ask questions and gain a sense of comfort about the 
nature and purpose of the research, and could contribute to a more nuanced analysis of current 
and emerging trends.” (Najam, 2006: 14).  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, finding 
participants was a challenge.   
By the end of November 2012 I began to worry that I would not find volunteers for this 
research.  For over six months, I had inserted myself into routine Muslim American events in 
southern Kansas City.  I was not achieving ethnographic immersion, but in the spirit of Emerson, 
Fretz, and Shaw’s, Writing Ethnographic Field Notes, I may categorize my presence as ‘watered-
down participant observation’.  In that half year, I visited prayer halls, made office calls, 
attended banquets, and even participated in an interfaith walk.  The time in between was filled 
with dozens of emails and telephone correspondence.  One mosque director agreed to publish a 
notice for my research in the mosque circular and another director had scheduled an introduction 
at a Friday Jum’ah prayers in early November.  However, this introduction was postponed twice.  
I spent the evening of 25 October 2012 laying out prayer mats at the Overland Park Convention 
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Center for the Feast of the Immolation Eid al Adha.  Twelve hours later, I attended the Eid 
Morning Prayer with one mosque and then proceeded to the brunch at another mosque.  The 
results of my labor were not encouraging; six months of networking had yet to yield a single 
volunteer for my research.  Although I had selected four Islamic organizations in Southern 
Kansas City from which to solicit volunteers (three mosques and one relief organization), but 
only one mosque showed potential for participation. 
At 1:45 pm on Friday, 30 November 2013, I found myself in the Islamic Center of 
Johnson County’s (ICJC) prayer hall during Jum’ah prayer.  I had attended prayer sessions 
before and always sat at the back of the hall in quiet reflection.  This time, however, the hall was 
full to capacity.  The ICJC is a repurposed ranch style home and at one time, the men’s prayer 
hall was a walk-in basement.  There was no place to sit in the back or to wait off to the side.  I 
took a prostrate position among the worshippers; however, I did not know the details of Muslim 
prayer.  I barely managed to follow the prayer cycle (rak’ahs) of the men in my periphery.  With 
my forehead to the clean carpet, it seemed an opportune time to put in a request for divine help 
with my research.  I did so, and managed to make it through the sermon (khuṭbah) and prayers 
without embarrassing myself.  Getting off the ground, I made introductions with nearby 
congregants and within seconds the mosque director (Aref) turned on the PA system to make an 
announcement.  I anticipated that he would announce my research.   
Before visiting the mosque, I emailed Aref some carefully measured talking points to 
make my introduction.  He announced my presence, but what came over the loudspeaker was not 
my talking points.  Rather, Aref stated (paraphrased): “People, I want to draw your attention to 
Joe Hall.  He is a KU graduate student doing important research about charity.  He needs your 
help and this research will be used to make important changes for Muslims in America.” My gut 
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sank upon hearing the extravagant promise of my research.  Notwithstanding, Aref seemed to 
know it was the right thing to say.  I was flooded with a small crowd that afternoon, and began 
soliciting for volunteers. I was quick to explain to the group that the real purpose and outcome of 
my research was to inquire about Islamic charity in Kansas City.  By the close of that Friday, I 
had gained enough contacts from the Islamic Center of Johnson County (fourteen volunteers) to 
begin my research.  
Islamic Center of Johnson County (ICJC):  Meeting the needs of a community 
The physical building of the ICJC mosque has been used for religious purposes since 2004.  
As a group, however, the ICJC began worshipping three years prior to that.  A survey conducted 
by prominent Muslims in Johnson County in 2002 revealed a sizeable Muslim American 
community in need of a place of worship: “Counting family members of the respondents, the 
group determined more than 3,500 Muslims live in the county.” (Hansen, 2005)  Before this 
inchoate congregation obtained a mosque, worshipers attended mosques in other counties or in 
makeshift prayer halls.  With the guidance of a few strong community leaders, the Islamic Center 
of Johnson County coalesced in March 2000, to form a Kansas-based 501(c) (3) tax exempt 
organization with a stated goal to: “…serve the spiritual, religious, and communal needs of 
Muslims in the cities of Overland Park, Leawood, and Olathe by establishing and operating a 
permanent Islamic Center in south Overland Park, KS.” (icjc.org) 
The ICJC went without a permanent home for over four years, but by early 2004, the 
organization purchased a small house with a four acre plot from a married couple in Oxford 
Ranch, a subdivision of Overland Park, Kansas.  The house was a late 1980s one story ranch 
style home with four bedrooms and a finished, walkout basement.  Overall, the price tag ran 
slightly over $500,000.00, but enough community support was generated to secure a mortgage.  
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The Kansas City Star announced the inauguration of the ICJC accordingly:  “In accordance with 
Islamic prohibition against loan interest (Ribā) the Johnson County Muslim community raised 
enough money to make the first loan payment in 2005” (Hansen, 2005).  By early 2005, the 
mosque was in full operation, with the distinction of being Johnson County’s “first permanent 
mosque” (Hansen, 2005).   
Not to be hampered by the architectural design of a ranch style home, the congregation 
repurposed all aspects of this building to create a place of worship and cultural education. The 
garage was refurbished to accommodate multiple ablution or washing stations.  The walkout 
basement became the main prayer room for males, and the rooms on the first floor became the 
women’s prayer room, classroom area, and administrative offices.  In recent years, the mosque 
added a 30-car capacity parking lot, which gets noticeably full at each Friday prayer (Jum’ah).  
Despite this success, plans are in the works to relocate the mosque to a future ICJC Campus; 
stunning architectural renderings can be found online at: icjc.org.   Repurposed buildings such as 
this have become a nation wide trend for Muslim Americans as observed in the 2011 U.S. 
Mosque Study:  “Suburban mosques are re-tracing the old pattern of purchasing or renting a 
building initially and then embarking at a later date on building their own facility. This process is 
likely due to the fact that almost all mosques do not seek loans from financial institutions, 
because of the Islamic ban on interest (Ribā).  Mosques must, therefore, first increase 
membership and confidence in order to start the process of building a mosque.” (Mosque Study, 
2011: 11)  It became quickly apparent in my focus group discussions that most of the volunteers 
for this study have been with ICJC since its formation. 
Focus group discussions: 
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The focus groups ranged in size from one to four people and were conducted at various 
locations in the Johnson County area (restaurants, coffee shops, libraries, and in one case, a 
residence).  Interview times were scheduled generally outside of prayer times, work hours, and 
family schedules, but in all cases, they accommodated the needs of these participants.  Although 
the group of respondents was small, it was surprisingly diverse.  Three volunteers were female 
and eleven were male.  Ten were Pakistani born, three were from India, and one did not disclose 
nationality.  Thirteen of the interviewees attended the Islamic Center of Johnson County, and one 
attended the director of Islamic Society of Greater Kansas City.  Two of the respondents are 
mosque board members.  Although no ages were asked, all respondents affirmed they were over 
21 years of age and all attended the mosque regularly.  The only personal information asked was 
first name, last name, number of years living in Kansas City and number of years attending their 
mosque.  
After reviewing and signing an informed consent statement (Appendix C), these 
volunteers were given an overview of research objectives and then shown the time line from 
Chapter 1 depicting the evolution of U.S. policies since 9/11.  Three broad questions formed the 
focal point of my group discussions.  The questions were intended to stimulate a diversity of 
responses and capture prevailing concerns regarding Islamic philanthropy in Kansas City and 
individual rights.  An expected outcome of these meetings was to determine if the volume of 
charity had changed over the last eleven years of U.S. policy changes, mosque closures and 
negative media.  Specifically, the three questions asked were: 
 
1. What kinds of charitable donations does the mosque receive, and which form of 
charity is the most frequently given/bestowed? 
     2.  How do you distribute these charitable contributions to the poor or needy? 
     3.  Are there any impediments to receiving and distributing charitable resources? 
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During all interviews, I restricted myself to brief, handwritten notes to keep volunteers 
focused.  Shortly after each meeting, I committed all observations to detailed field notes.  
Discussions were kept informal and open, allowing interviewees to converse freely while 
supplying leading questions.  In some cases, respondents drifted off topic, but small group 
discussions always returned to the three interview questions above.  For purposes of this 
research, the fourteen volunteers were given a common Muslim pseudonym to preserve 
confidentiality and for quick reference.  The figure below depicts general demographic 
information of these interviewees.   
 Pseudonym 
Interview  
Date 
 Occupation Mosque 
Country of 
Origin 
Years with  
Mosque 
Years in KC 
 FARHAN  12/08/12-A  Engineer with Sprint ICJC Pakistani 7 11 
 IMRAN  12/08/12-A  Engineer with Sprint ICJC Pakistani 5 5 
 ASIF  12/08/12-A  Retired City Planner ICJC Pakistani 10 40+ 
 TARIQ  12/9/12  Undisclosed ICJC Indian 9 14 
 AFSANA  12/9/12  Home maker ICJC Indian 9 14 
 LAILA  12/9/12  Home maker ICJC Pakistani 6 6 
 YUSUF  12/9/12  Undisclosed ICJC Pakistani 6 6 
 HAMZA  12/13/12 
 Teacher; KU Med / Public 
 Health Researcher 
ICJC Pakistani 10 16 
 ASAAD  12/15/12 
Professor, Math & Science, 
KCKCC 
ICJC Indian 10 19 
 ESHAL  12/1/12 Charity coordinator ICJC Pakistani 7 7 
 AREF  12/1/12 
Chief of Orthopedics, KC VA 
Med Center 
ICJC Pakistani 10 10 
 ADNAN  11/9/12 Manager: ISGKC ISGKC Did not disclose 11 22 
 OMAR  12/08/12-B 
Board Member at Islamic 
Center of KS, INC  
ICJC Pakistani 5 5 
 IBRAHIM  1/27/13 
Electrical Engineer, 
Ericsson 
ICJC Pakistani 10 15 
 
Table 2: Volunteers from the Islamic Center of Johnson County (ICJC) 
 
Even though these respondents had volunteered to participate, there was still an element of 
insularity within the focus group discussions.  Seven of the fourteen individuals were observed to 
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speak freely and with candor while rest demonstrated varying degrees of hesitancy.  This was the 
case in spite of my best efforts to pose broad, open-ended questions.  By volume, these were the 
overall responses: 
     Question 1: What kind of charitable donations does the mosque receive, and 
     which is the most frequent?  
 
 Cash contributions were the most frequent response; all fourteen respondents indicated 
that cash contributions were the most common form of charity.  One individual went as 
far as to say: “zakāt equals cash” (Omar, interview with author, December 8, 2012).  Six 
said that cash was often given to avoid any kind of paper trail that could lead to federal 
scrutiny.  Another six volunteers said that they gave blank checks to the mosque director 
to eliminate the burden of researching legitimate or approved charitable causes. 
 Ten respondents said that monetary contributions were given directly to the mosque 
director.  This was done with the conviction that a director understood the community’s 
most pressing need and also because the mosque assumed responsibility for finding a 
credible charity.  The implication from discussion was that donors would not be guilty of 
mishandled charity if they left it up to the mosque to decide.  
 Ten respondents discussed clothing articles as charitable items (one added appliances & 
household items).  Another stated that he regularly took used winter coats to needy 
people in his Pakistani hometown. 
 Eight cited volunteering as a form of charity; in two cases, this was within the Greater 
Kansas City Area.  One respondent mentioned a group of volunteers sent in response to 
the May 2011 Joplin tornado disaster (Harrop, Dallas Morning News: 2011).  
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 Seven interviewees mentioned stable food items as a charitable good, although prevailing 
opinion was that this was less frequent because Kansas City’s food shelters were better 
suited to manage food items than mosques.  
 Five volunteers stated that educational charity in the form of school supplies and 
backpacks was also a common practice in Kansas City and abroad. 
     Question 2: How do you distribute charitable contributions to the poor or needy?  
 
 Seven interviewees claimed that charity was sent directly to their country of origin; four 
had personally brought charitable funds to their home cities in Pakistan and India. 
 Another half of the respondents claimed to personally know the recipient of their charity 
– whether it was a family member, close friend or a neighbor in need.  
 Ten volunteers indicated that they contributed to short notice charity drives at Friday 
prayers (Jum’ah).  These drives were generally for natural disasters such as the 2010 
Pakistan floods or the 2011 tornado in Joplin, Missouri.  Roughly half of these 
respondents felt uncomfortable donating because it was difficult to verify the credibility 
of charitable organizations on such short notice.  As mentioned previously, cash or blank 
checks were given in these cases to reduce paper trails or defer decision making to the 
mosque.   
 When asked to expand on who the ‘needy’ were the interviewees provided compound 
answers.  Two were adamant that the mosque knew best who needed charity.  Three 
individuals believed that the needy were those suffering from conflict or natural disasters 
in their native countries.  Another three felt that the newly arrived Muslim Americans 
(e.g. Somalis) were in need of charity.  Two interviewees were concerned for at-risk 
Muslim American women that were victims of abuse and poverty.  Three indicated that 
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the infirmed and those without health insurance were in need of charity.   Another three 
respondents highlighted education (instruction to the Muslim youth and educational 
outreach [da’wah]) as a legitimate form of charity.  An unexpected response given by 
seven respondents was that the mosque itself was the focus of charity.  The conviction 
being that the mosque was an important component of Islamic communal stability and 
cultural identity.   Charitable contributions for mosque upkeep, repairs and expansion 
were deemed essential, a sentiment echoed by Adil Najam in his work: “To the extent 
they give to faith-based organizations, the vast bulk of this giving is to places of worship 
in the US that are as much centers of community and social congregation as of religious 
congregation.” (Najam, 2006: 178) 
 
     Question 3: Are there any impediments to receiving and distributing charitable 
     resources? 
 
 Eight volunteers expressed concern over government backlash associated with 
inadvertent contributions to a prohibited organization.  These respondents feared possible 
blacklisting, censure, penalty fines and even detainment.  
 Thirteen respondents expressed suspicion that the government conducted surveillance of 
the Muslim American community in general. 
 All fourteen interviewees indicated that they exercised greater caution in locating 
credible charities within the last 5-10 years. 
Regardless of the specter of surveillance and discrimination, nine respondents expressed 
optimism about a future in the United States.  Specifically, that America offered more 
philanthropic opportunities than their country of origin.  Moreover, two respondents believed 
that conditions in the U.S. were improving; more non-Muslims were making an effort to 
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understand Islam and make cultural accommodations (e.g. prayer rooms added to hospitals).  On 
the question of the volume Islamic contributions since 9/11, focus group results are less 
conclusive:  Two volunteers felt there was no change in the volume of philanthropy in the past 
ten years.  Six respondents did not answer the question and only one contended that charity had 
increased in Kansas City.  Five individuals were convinced that charity had decreased since 9/11.   
Overall observations from the fourteen ICJC volunteers suggest that Kansas City Muslim 
Americans practice a diverse range of philanthropy (zakāt and ṣadaqah), through innovative 
channels.  This charity is directed at: the family level, the Kansas City Area, disasters across the 
U.S. and impoverished communities overseas.  Although the volume of Islamic charity since 
9/11 is difficult to gauge from focus group results, U.S. counterterrorism policies have made a 
discernible impact on Kansas City’s Muslim American community.  Prevailing concerns of 
surveillance and government backlash create a perception that Muslim American donors are 
ascribed ‘guilt by association’ to terrorist organizations.  Consequently, most respondents have 
invested more effort in researching nonprofit organizations while expanding charitable 
contributions to causes outside of the Muslim community since 9/11.  Additionally, Kansas 
City’s Muslims have diversified charitable methods beyond monetary practices that involve 
government oversight (e.g. volunteerism and second-hand goods).  Encouraging trends from 
budget analysis coupled with focus group discussion findings suggest that zakāt and ṣadaqah are 
resilient traditions that continue in The Greater Kansas City Area in spite an anti-Muslim 
sentiment expressed through U.S. policy and media.  Further analysis and discussion of these 
trends will be covered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Analysis 
 
The two previous chapters have been an attempt to describe the national security mindset 
and outline trends in Kansas City’s Islamic philanthropy.  This chapter makes an interpretation 
of the counterterrorism timeline, and research data from Chapters 2 to draw a conclusion 
regarding the primary thesis question; How have U.S. counterterrorism policies affected Muslim 
American charitable practices and civil rights in Kansas City since 9/11?  First, this section 
discusses the fallout from America’s counterterrorism policies since 9/11 and the resultant 
impact on Muslim American civil rights.  Second this chapter explores the findings from budget 
analyses and focus group discussions against the backdrop of various socioeconomic factors to 
account for the performance of Muslim American philanthropy since 9/11.  Lastly, this chapter 
highlights the positive attributes of Kansas City’s Muslim Americans derived from this analysis.   
Islam as a racial minority:   
The chronology of U.S. policy listed in Chapter 1 betrays a Muslim stereotype that easily 
predates the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).  Prior to the Second 
World War, the U.S. governmental perspective of the Muslim demographic was generally 
through an ethnical and cultural lens: “’Ethnicity’ theory replaced biological, race-based theories 
[for the U.S.] in the 1930s; however, ‘ethnicity,’ like ‘race,’ remains a nebulous term, often 
denoting ‘group formation based on culture and descent.’” (Saliba, Suleiman, 1999: 307)  This 
pejorative view continued forty years later with U.S. media portraying Muslim and Arab types 
as: “…sadistic, treacherous, low.  Slave trader, camel driver, moneychanger, colorful 
scoundrel...” (Said, 1978: 286)  Still, with this ethnic typecast, white America viewed its Muslim 
diaspora as benign: “…post-1965 American Muslim immigrants.., came not as political or 
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religious refugees, but as economic migrants who became acculturated to the norms of American 
society...” (Akhtar, 2011: 772)  Until the 1990s, America would continue to view Islam as: 
“…deficient and archaic” (Haddad, 2011: 54), often characterized by: “…mob scenes 
contextualized by themes of anger, violence, and rote behavior.” (Cainkar, 2011: 153)  The 
government’s ethnic approach to identifying the Muslim demographic is evident in the 2000 U.S. 
Census (described in the introduction), which lists ancestral nations of origin for ‘select groups’. 
The U.S. government perspective on Islam shifted from ethnicity to race within the 
decade running up to the 9/11 attacks.  Consider this extract from a 1999 study on antiterrorism 
law: “Now fear of terrorism surfaces in the airlines passenger profiling of Arab Americans 
started in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing and the TWA 800 disaster.” (Suleiman, 
1999: 87)  The statement is a haunting precursor to racial themes that emerged in focus group 
discussions and the literature I have encountered in this research (Greenburg, Roth, Wille, 2004: 
57; Ratner, 2012: 611; Cesari, 2004: 40; Cainkar, 2009: 153).  Interestingly, the 2010 census 
altogether eliminates the ethnic question, breaking down Kansas City’s population into nine race 
groups and the total number of foreign-born persons. (factfinder2.census.gov)  Kansas City’s 
Muslims could self-identify any one of the 2010 Census groups: White, black, African 
American, Asian or foreign-born.  Ironically, U.S. leaders projected cultural respect for Islamic 
tradition, as demonstrated in the preamble to the 2001 USA Patriot Act:  
(1) the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, including Arab Americans,  
Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia, must be protected, and that 
every effort must be taken to preserve their safety; 
(2) any acts of violence or discrimination against any Americans be condemned; 
and 
(3) the Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism of fellow citizens from all ethnic, 
racial, and religious backgrounds. 
        (Public Law 107-46, 2001: Section 102) 
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This law singles out Arabs and Muslims on its first page; an unnecessary measure 
because the Patriot Act is meant to protect all American citizens.  This preamble alone could be 
admission of efforts to racialize Islam and Muslim Americans.  The heavy-handed approach to 
U.S. counterterrorism policy and concerted efforts to target Muslim Americans, suggests that the 
Patriot Act may be tongue-in-cheek legislation.  Islamic Scholar Iqbal Akhtar puts forward an 
interesting view on the ‘racialization’ of Islam in the United States:  “In reaction to September 
11, first and second generation American Muslims of South Asian and Arab extraction were 
placed in the political category of the racial ‘other.’” (Akhtar, 2011: 769) 
    Aside from the Oklahoma City bombing (Cainkar, 2009: 108) and the TWA disaster 
mentioned above, other experiences may account for the change of U.S. racial conscience to 
include; the 1991 Gulf War, the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 1993 
Middle East Peace Process (Burr, Colins, 2006: 213).  For whatever reasons, this new U.S. 
perspective towards race corresponded with a noticeable change in younger Muslim Americans: 
“Second-generation American Muslims, in contrast [to first-generation], are thoroughly 
Americanized, generally adopting the civil religion and the civic ideal of equality.  When 
confronted with perceived discrimination, they react negatively and viscerally.”  (Akhtar, 2011: 
773)  The implementation of U.S. policies (that treat Islam as a race) on a population of Muslim 
Americans (dissatisfied with the status quo) has created ongoing, civic debate.  Critiques of U.S. 
counterterrorism policies are recurrent throughout the literature on this topic and continue to beg 
the question; How have these policies affected Muslim Americans in The Greater Kansas City 
Area?  They form the dialogue central to the Muslim American civil liberty debate and warrant 
further review. 
Policy Analysis: 
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    As described in chapter one, the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), Global Relief Foundation 
(GRF), Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), Al-Haramain Foundation (AHIF), Islamic 
American Relief Agency (IARA), Kindhearts of Toledo and Goodwill Charitable Organization 
(GCO) were shut down under the auspices of U.S. antiterrorist funding policies for allegedly 
providing support to terrorist organizations. These closures reveal multiple instances when U.S. 
policies appear to trump basic constitutional rights for Muslim Americans.  The resulting 
damages are now well codified in civil-liberty publications and legal journals, but they merit a 
brief review for purposes of this analysis.  Those U.S. Constitutional rights that appear to be 
jeopardized by measures in U.S. counterterrorism policy are discussed below. 
1. Attacks on first amendment rights:  “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” (senate.gov/civics) 
   
A charitable donation to a nonprofit organization is an act of free association.  
Communicating with charitable organizations or other donors that share similar values is also 
freedom of speech.  Each step in the government’s “designation-and-asset-freezing approach” 
(Clunan, 2006: 592) to shutting down charities is an opportunity to suppress free speech and 
association.  The three steps below are the most contentious: 
   a. Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) designation: Terrorist designations 
are an immediate means of suppressing association.  This program automatically prohibits 
anyone from transacting with an organization labeled an SDGT.  Five of the closed Islamic 
charities (HLF, GRF, BIF, AHIF, and IARA) filed injunctions against their SDGT designation, 
convinced that their histories with alleged terrorist organizations were in fact, lawful 
associations.  These injunctions were overruled.  To this day all seven Islamic Charities remain 
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on the Treasury’s terrorist list.  The SDGT designation is also a measure that stigmatizes 
suspected organizations.  According to legal expert Eric Sandberg-Zakian this process: 
“…publicly brands a designee with the letters of shame, “SDGT,” discourages members of the 
community from interacting with the designee, and creates a direct confrontation between the 
designee and the public through press releases and office raids.” (Sandberg-Zakian, 2011: 108) 
   b. Material support Statue:  All seven closed charities were shut down on the premise 
that they provided material support to terrorist organizations.  The material support statute has 
evolved with each U.S. Antiterrorism law over the past 18 years to become a broad, yet at times 
dangerously ambiguous metric for determining guilt.  Four of the accused Islamic charities 
(HLF, GRF, BIF and AHIF) legally challenged indictments of material support on the grounds 
that the statute was vague and all past charitable actions were within the law.  These were also 
overruled in court.  Given its ambiguity, the material support statute could be used to interpret 
any charitable gesture as an illicit action: “Because the material support statute contains no 
general exception for humanitarian assistance, many benign activities that are crucial for 
humanitarian aid and disaster relief are labeled material support, including provision of food aid, 
latrines, blankets, clothing, or tents.  (ACLU, 2009 p. 11) 
   c. Press Releases:  The U.S. government issued press releases for all seven U.S.-based 
Islamic charities on the same day they were shut down.  Without any legal ruling or 
comprehensive investigation, the government issued press releases that stated emphatically that 
each charity supported terrorism.  Naturally, these press releases were echoed in local and 
national media.  The resulting public stigmatization was further exacerbated by the timing of 
several Islamic charity closures.  As discussed in chapter 1, four Islamic charities were shut 
down and designated terrorist supporters prior to or during the holy month of Ramadan (HLF, 
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GRF, BIF and IARA).  As such, the Muslim American community (who had faithfully set aside 
zakāt all year long) witnessed the forced closure and public defamation of four reputable Islamic 
charities during the very season they are mandated to give charity.  Whether calculated or not, 
these closures had an immediate impact on Muslim American’s rights of free speech and more 
importantly free association.  Most participants in the focus group discussions indicated they 
were adversely influenced by media and here say accounts of forced charity closures.  One 
volunteer lamented: “When the Holy Land Foundation was shut down, I did not know what I 
was going to do for the next Ramadan!” (Tariq, interview with author, December 9, 2012) 
1. Attacks on fourth amendment rights: “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized” (senate.gov/civics/)   
 
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act 
of 2005 prescribed enhanced search capabilities to federal agencies.  These statutes allowed U.S. 
authorities to conduct search and seizures using with delayed or sealed warrants.  This is 
tantamount to a no-notice search and seizure, a violation of the U.S. 4
th
 amendment rights. 
(Jamal, 2011: 6; Zabel, Benjamin, 2008: 81)  The delayed warrant also meant that any forcibly 
closed charity would not discover the details of probable cause for at least 30 days, possibly 
more.  All seven closed Islamic charities were subject to search and seizures under these new 
statutes; the few that legally contested were overruled by the U.S. Courts.  In this same vein, two 
of the Islamic charities (HLF and AHIF) also accused the government of conducting warrantless 
surveillance.  These appeals were also overturned. 
   3. Attacks on fifth amendment Rights: “No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
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time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” (senate.gov/civics/)   
 
   Elements of the ‘designation-and-asset-freezing’ process described above are also 
considered violations of fifth-amendment rights.  HLF, GRF, BIF, AHIF and IARA contested 
that their SDGT designation was a predetermination of guilt.  They also protested that blocked 
assets were premature punitive measures, occurring long before any of comprehensive 
investigation or fair trial would be conducted.  (Al-Marayati, 2005: 338; Sandberg-Zakian, 
2011:14; Zabel, Benjamin, 2008: 38)  The GRF and GCO also appealed against the 
government’s use of the Ex-Post Facto Clause, which in this case, signified incrimination for 
consorting with an organization before it was designated terrorist).  The combined effects of 
these statutes create a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ perception within the Islamic charitable 
community.  Moreover, the courts generally supported a legal precedence in favor of federal 
government actions.  An extract from GRF’s injunction demonstrates the prevailing 
interpretation of the Patriot Acts in favor of the U.S. government: “Although Global Relief's 
assets are temporarily blocked during OFAC's investigation, such a blocking does not constitute 
a punitive confiscation of property because no forfeiture in favor of the government has 
occurred...”  (GRF v. O’neill, 2002; 22) 
4. Attacks on sixth amendment rights:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” (senate.gov/civics/) 
 
Government interpretations of the 2001 and 2005 Patriot Acts have prevented several 
Islamic charities from mounting a fair and timely legal defense (Ratner, 2012: 595-7, 612; 
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Sandberg-Zakian, 2011:14; Zabel, Benjamin, 2008: 111).  Three of the seven closure cases 
(GRF, BIF and AHIF) suffered some form of administrative delay on the part of the government 
ranging from one to four years.  These delays included; lagging federal investigations, slow 
release of evidence, prolonged INS hearings or delayed terrorist designations.  Ultimately, they 
eliminated any semblance of a speedy trial.  Each Islamic charity was subject to an 
administrative ‘limbo’ where guilt was predetermined and no philanthropic association could 
occur.  Federal agencies used sequestered or anonymous witnesses in three of the closures (HLF, 
BIF and AHIF), severely hampering the ability to confront accusing witnesses.  Loyola 
University Law graduate Emily Ratner coined this as: “…Artfully eroding the right to 
constitutionally sufficient cross-examination” (Ratner, 2012: 608).  Four charities (HLF, GRF, 
BIF and IARA) contested the use of classified documents and sealed evidence in their 
indictments; mounting a defense when one is barred from seeing incriminating evidence is nearly 
impossible.  Moreover, charities placed in a ‘blocked pending investigation’ (BPI) status, were 
unable to access funds and pay for timely legal defense counsel, a matter that was contested by 
HLF, GRF and AHIF.  
Shallow victory: 
A damaging precedence has been set in the decade long civil-liberty debate between 
Muslim Americans and the U.S. Government, an assertion put forward by Ratner: “The cautions 
taken by these courts have potentially permanently damaged the ability of one segment of 
American society to fully engage in civic and religious life, and may encourage future courts to 
disregard a fundamental constitutional right of U.S criminal defendants.” (Ratner, 2012: 621).  
Although the U.S. Treasury and Justice Department can cite the number of closed organizations 
and frozen assets as a measure of success, it has been nearly impossible to establish any direct 
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links to terrorism.  The ACLU provides a summary of this challenge:  “Of nine U.S.-based 
charities whose assets have been seized by the Department of Treasury, seven are Muslim 
charities, and two are Tamil charities. In the majority of these cases, the government has not 
brought charges; only three designated U.S.-based Muslim charities have faced criminal 
prosecution, and only one has been convicted.” (ACLU, 2009: 8) The few successful 
prosecutions against Islamic charities involved crimes that had nothing to do with terrorism: 
government misconduct, racketeering, money laundering, tax fraud and Illegal money transfers.  
Both sides of the issue could view these facts as a victory but given the government’s tarnished 
image and the Muslim American community’s damaged psyche, it is a shallow victory at best.   
This precedence seems to have touched every corner of America and certainly was an 
element of concern in the focus group discussions conducted for this research.  Chapter 2 
revealed that over half of the ICJC volunteers were fearful of U.S. government backlash 
associated with charitable giving.  Likewise, a majority of the fourteen respondents harbored a 
strong suspicion of government surveillance.  When inquiring about the volume of charity since 
9/11 five respondents believed donations had declined.  Two ICJC volunteers felt that donations 
remained the same while another six avoided the question altogether.  Given that only one 
individual felt charity had increased, attention must be given to the six volunteers that would not 
comment.  This group could have avoided the question because they thought it ludicrous or too 
sensitive.   When looking at the observation of ‘hesitancy’ (shown by 50% of the volunteers) my 
impression is that this was indeed a sensitive topic.  Most likely, the majority of Muslims 
interviewed held the conviction that individual charity had declined since 9/11 as a result of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.    
What is uncontested is that a majority of those Muslim Americans interviewed felt that 
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practicing zakāt and ṣadaqah would put their first, fourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights at 
risk.  This situation is further exacerbated by a general misunderstanding of Islamic philanthropy 
as demonstrated during the FBI’s visit to the ICJC in January 2013 (See introduction).  During 
the question and answer session, the senior FBI agent was responding to a question about charity 
using a hypothetical scenario (paraphrased). 
Agent: “OK, suppose you meet this hitchhiker who is down on his luck and on his way to 
Florida.  Let’s say you get crazy and give him $500 dollars, and…”  
 
Mosque Attendee: “(Interrupting) But sir that is something we would do.”  
 
There was no confusion; the attendee meant that a Muslim would have no problem giving 
$500 to someone in need if he had the means.  The agent was taken aback but acknowledged the 
mistake, and continued with the hypothetical scenario.  That moment in January 2013 not only 
reinforced this mosque’s concern for balancing religious obligation with U.S. law; it also 
revealed the government’s unfamiliarity with Islamic charity. Muslims do give to the needy.  
They give lots.  The specter of racial discrimination and the fear of losing constitutional rights 
have not degraded the giving spirit of Kansas City Muslim Americans.  An analysis of 
observations taken from the focus group discussions with the fourteen ICJC volunteers reveals 
other positive attributes of Kansas City’s Islamic philanthropy. 
Opening up to the secular and non-Muslim:  Each person interviewed seemed to 
ascribe to a religious conviction that honored zakāt and ṣadaqah.  In several instances volunteers 
even made references to the Prophet Muhammad, the Qur’an or hadīth in order to underscore 
discussion points.  There were, however, multiple instances throughout the interview process that 
suggested the drive to give charity was reinforced (or derived) by a personal, life-altering 
experience such as natural disaster or death of a loved one.  This did not imply that these 
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volunteers forfeited their personal religious conviction.  On the contrary, the personal 
identification with loss and suffering seemed to reinforce a strong religious obligation towards 
zakāt and ṣadaqah; Kansas City Muslim Americans practice a resilient form of philanthropy not 
limited to a religious mandate. 
Moreover, the focus of charitable giving has shifted to include the needs of the non-
Muslims.  Multiple respondents indicated at one time or another that their charitable 
contributions shifted to include secular and nondenominational causes.  On an individual level, 
discretionary charity (ṣadaqah) was given to non-Muslim friends or bystanders in need.  On a 
local level, donors gave to Kansas City charities or collection efforts to gather food, clothing and 
school supplies.  At a national and international level, donations were sent to non-Muslim 
disaster relief organizations.  This broadened application of Islamic charity to non-Muslim 
causes is echoed in similar studies in other U.S. metropolitan areas (Cainkar, 2009: 185; Najam, 
2006: 179) 
Voluntarism:  A majority of the respondents discussed some form of volunteering within 
Kansas City as a means of honoring Islamic charity.  Interviewees gave varied examples of 
volunteering venues to include: invalid care, free medical clinics, soup kitchens, charity drives, 
classroom instruction, mosque duties and local disaster relief.  This encouraging trend is 
corroborated by Adil Najam’s findings within the U.S. Pakistani diaspora. (Najam, 2006: 155)  
Several respondents mentioned that volunteering is charity that will not get one in trouble (it 
leaves no paper trail).  More importantly, this volunteering trend suggests a communal 
investment to improve the condition of Kansas City and the Muslim American community 
therein.  On an individual level, Muslim Americans reap spiritual benefits by volunteering.  On a 
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communal level, these volunteers improve the standing of the Muslim American community and 
detract from an ongoing discourse of racial stereotypes. 
The Mosque is a charitable cause:  As mentioned in Chapter 2, half of the respondents 
gave to causes within the mosque.  This demonstrates the importance that Muslim Americans 
hold toward their mosques.  A nonprofit status is not enough to sustain a mosque; consequently, 
charitable giving becomes a vital resource for Islamic institutions.  Donations are often applied 
to mosque repairs or facility upgrades (e.g. air conditioning systems).  At least two of the 
mosques within this research area maintain a zakāt fund specifically for construction of newer 
and larger worship facilities.  Five of these respondents indicated that the mosque was the center 
of the Muslim community and essential to preserving Islamic identity.  Cesari describes the full-
service capabilities of U.S. mosques: “Moreover, Islamic centers now also provide such 
activities as courses on the Qu’ran for children and adults, conference series and seminars, 
courses for new converts (primarily in the United States) assistance with funeral rites, 
recreational activities for children and women, social assistance, and even psychological 
counseling.” (Cesari, 2004: 128)  The mosque was not only the recipient of charity, but often a 
collector and distributor as well.  Several respondents recalled giving to mosque charity drives 
on a regular basis for natural disasters or relief agencies overseas. 
Moving beyond the role of the victim:  The matter of ‘insularity’ mentioned at the 
outset of Chapter 2 was demonstrated by half of the volunteers during focus group discussions.  
Several authors used in this research seem to broach the topic of insularity in one manner or 
another.  Jocelyn Cesari describes Muslims with: “…an ambivalence that is neither hypocrisy 
nor dishonesty, but a means of survival.” (Cesari, 2004: 158)  Iqbal Akhtar mentions a 
phenomenon of: “…polital apathy and ambivalence...” (Akhtar, 2011: 773)  Lisa Suhair Majaj 
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hints that Arab Americans have an inability to “…elicit responses to their concerns without 
affiliating with other minority groups.” (Majaj, 1999: 326)  Whatever the phenomenon is called, 
be it insularity, hesitancy, ambivalency or apathy, it was a point of contention for two outspoken 
Muslim American volunteers: Eshal and Aref.  Both volunteers acknowledged that Muslim 
discrimination and profiling continue to this day, but their greater disappointment lay within the 
Muslim community.  Eshal and Aref were simply tired of Muslim Americans playing the role of 
quiet victim.  More importantly they felt Muslim American silence was “partially responsible for 
a general misunderstanding of the Muslim culture.”  Eshal and Aref’s comments seem to 
corroborate the observation of communal insularity.  In the same discussion, they also admitted 
that Muslim Americans ‘owned’ responsibility for their own acculturation within America.  In 
spite of negative stereotypes and U.S. policies that stigmatize Islamic charity, the respondents 
from the ICJC voiced a strong commitment to honoring practices of zakāt and ṣadaqah.  This 
complements the analysis of those Islamic nonprofit organizations in Kansas City (chapter 2) 
that have performed well since 9/11.  What has yet to be interpreted are those factors outside of 
Islamic charity and U.S. policy that may have also influenced research findings.   
Between Charitable Storms:  This section of Chapter 3 looks at several socioeconomic factors 
in the last decade that may have impacted the donation patterns of Muslim Americans and 
Islamic charities in the Greater Kansas City Area since 9/11.  Specifically, it looks at four subject 
areas that could influence Kansas City’s philanthropic trends. 
Activity within the counterterrorism program:  Actions within the U.S. counterterrorism 
program appear to have tapered off after 2006.  The last major legislation governing 
antiterrorism financing policy was the Patriot Act II, signed into law in March 2006.  For 
security advocates this was a sigh of relief, reviving the almost expired provisions of the 2001 
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Patriot Act.  For civil-rights advocates (and Muslim Americans) the contentious statutes of this 
2006 law continued to be a source of anxiety in the later half of the decade.  The U.S. Treasury’s 
terrorist designation program (SDGT) also demonstrated some unique fluctuations in this period.  
It is now common practice for Muslim Americans to check a charity’s legitimacy against the 
Treasury’s SDGT list; an act in itself that could affect donor anxiety and sense of outrage.   
An analysis of the Treasury’s Annual Terrorist Assets Reports from 2005 to 2011 shows 
that an average of 32 entities were added to the Terrorist Designation list each year. 
(Treasury.gov)  This nominal amount was a drop in the number of SDGTs when compared to the 
four years after 9/11 (an average of 77 additions per year).  This suggests that there may have 
been a decrease in the government’s ‘naming’ program from 2005 to 2011.  There was not 
another spike in the SDGT list until 2012 (with the addition of 109 SDGTs).  By February of 
2006, five of the seven of Islamic Charities also had been shut down.  The Goodwill Charitable 
Organization would not be shut down until 17 months later in July of 2007.  The last closed 
charity was non-Muslim and would not shut down until February 2009 (Tamil Foundation).   
This marked drop in federal activity from 2006 to 2011 may have served as a respite for those 
Muslim Americans and Islamic organizations anxious about giving charity. 
Hate Crimes: The FBI Hate Crimes Statistics is another means of gauging the climate of 
tolerance in Kansas City.  The bureau has maintained hate crimes statistics by city, state and year 
as far back as 1992.  Data mining on the FBI’s Hate Crime website can reveal hate crime 
incidents in Kansas City that reflect a bias against religion (fbi.gov).  This data only shows, 
however, that some form of religion (be it Christian, Jewish, Muslim or other) was the focus of 
hate crime bias.  It does not show how many hate crimes are attributed to an Islamic bias.  Even 
so, the data base shows religiously based hate crimes for the Greater Kansas City Area dropping 
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from 17 incidents in 2006 to 5 incidents for 2007 and 2008.  This count rose slightly to 9 in 
2010, only to drop to 5 incidents in 2011.  The decline in hate crimes after 2006 is not 
conclusive.  There is the possibility that incidents of hate crimes may have decreased since 2006.  
Another possibility is that hate crimes did not decrease, but victims were increasingly hesitant to 
report hate crimes for fear of reciprocity or government inactivity.  This phenomenon could also 
be attributed to a combination of both of these possibilities (reduced hate crimes and decrease 
reporting).  When viewed with other favorable socioeconomic factors, however, this decline in 
hate crimes might suggest that 2007 through 2010 was a period of increased tolerance towards 
religious minorities.  
 U.S. Economy:  From the perspective of the U.S. economy, 2006 through 2011 posed 
some challenges for the Greater Kansas City Area.  By early 2008, an economic recession would 
be in full swing: “Despite declining energy costs, wholesale prices soared in July, giving the 
economy the worst 12 months of inflation in almost three decades and increasing pressure on the 
Federal Reserve to raise interest rates.” (Maura, LA Times: 2008)  Simultaneously, the Kansas 
City unemployment rate rose from 5.7% in 2008 to 8.9% in 2009, remaining constant through 
2011 (bls.gov).  These economic indicators from 2006 to 2011may have adversely impacted 
Muslim American charitable contributions at the individual and organizational level. 
 National and International Disasters:  Another factor that affects a community’s giving 
patterns and draws on pools of charitable resources is the occurrence of national and 
international disasters.   2005 saw major disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 
(Suddath, 2010), Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Treaster, Zurnike, 2005), and the Pakistan 
Earthquake in 2005 (Septunga, 2005).  The next major disasters started in the summer of 2010, 
with heavy floods in Pakistan (Tu, 2011) and the Joplin Tornado in May 2011 (Harrop, 2011).  
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The five-year lull in major disasters (2005-2010) may have reduced the strain on Kansas City’s 
philanthropy, allowing Islamic charities to regenerate charitable resources. 
     Aside from the 2006 Patriot Act, the downturned economy, and the closure of two Islamic 
charities, the events listed above suggest that the calmer period from 2006 through 2010 offered 
conditions in which Muslim American charity might regain momentum.  The budget analysis of 
the six Kansas City Islamic charities discussed in Chapter 2 tends to support this notion.  Chapter 
2 revealed not only that these charities performed as good as their non-Muslim counterparts, but 
four of the six Islamic charities demonstrated a marked increase in charitable revenue from 2006 
to 2010.  A 2011 study conducted by The Hartford Institute for Religion Research describes 
similar trends with American mosques across the U.S. during that timeframe:  “The percentage 
of mosques with a budget over $100,000 has risen substantially since 2000—39% of mosques in 
2011 had a budget over $100,000 as compared to 24% in 2000. The financial capabilities of 
mosques have grown over the last decade.  Apparently the severe economic recession did not 
derail completely the financial progress of mosques.” (Bagby, 2011: 20)  This success on an 
organizational level suggests that Muslim charities in Kansas City have performed well in spite 
of the current program of U.S. counterterrorism policies. 
The varied responses from focus group discussions make it more difficult to gage how 
individual Islamic charity performed under the socioeconomic factors described above.  Analysis 
of this data shows that Kansas City Muslims now do more research to find credible charities in 
spite of the conviction that their very actions may put constitutional rights at risk. To avoid 
federal scrutiny, they have broadened charity to include non-Muslim and secular causes.  To 
eliminate paper trails, Muslim Americans volunteer more and give more discretionary cash 
donations.  This diversified approach to giving zakāt and ṣadaqah coupled with the previously 
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mentioned trait of insularity might make it impossible to quantify how much charity has been 
given year-to-year since 9/11.  What we can conclude is that Muslim Americans in Kansas City 
still feel obligated to give charity in spite of suspicions of surveillance and the threat of federal 
backlash. Those stereotypes and stigmas advanced by mainstream America have not deterred 
Kansas City’s Muslim Americans from honoring Islamic philanthropy. 
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Conclusion 
 
The synthesis of the limited data collected from annual budgets, and local and national 
socioeconomic factors suggests that Islamic faith-based organizations in Kansas City benefited 
from the respite between the years 2006 and 2010, demonstrating general growth and the 
resilient characteristics of zakāt and ṣadaqah.  Additionally, those Muslim Americans 
interviewed for this research demonstrated an innovative commitment to honoring practices of 
Islamic charity in spite of the fear of U.S. government surveillance and backlash.  These positive 
trends occurred in spite of U.S. antiterrorism funding policies which stigmatize Islamic charity 
and racialize the Muslim American community.  Results from the focus group discussions 
suggest that the city’s Muslims still have a strong commitment to honoring Islamic charity in 
creative ways that are expedient, diversified, and often devoid of a paper trail.   
The limitations of this research are evident.  At the outset of this project, only three 
groups of ‘constituents or stakeholders’ (Bringle, Clayton, Price, 2009: 5) collaborated to form a 
meaningful research question:  One student, two faculty members, and two community 
organizations.  Those tax records analyzed from the six Islamic charities are a fraction of the 
total Islamic organizations in Kansas City.  The fourteen ICJC volunteers (as described in the 
introduction) are mostly male, non-Arab, predominantly Indo-Pakistani, first generation Sunni 
Muslims from Overland Park, Kansas.  The analysis of U.S. policies remained at a national level, 
devoid of legislature and public opinions at a state and local level.  The lines of academic inquiry 
explored only Islamic charity, avoiding many other relevant civil-liberty topics.  To assume that 
these limited research elements are entirely representative of Muslim American philanthropy in 
The Greater Kansas City Area is academically hazardous; the complex nature of Islamic charity 
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within the U.S. merits further research.  To ignore the findings of this research, however, would 
be wasteful.   
This current research does not adequately fill a gap in any body of literature regarding 
Muslim Americans in the Greater Kansas City Area.  It does however, achieve something just as 
important:  this research identifies a critical gap in the cultural understanding of Kansas City’s 
Muslim American community.  As stated in the introduction, a single publication regarding 
Kansas City’s Muslim community has yet to be written.  A search of Kansas City’s library 
systems, Amazon.com and Google will yield historical books for many of Kansas City’s 
communities to include whites, African Americans, Mexicans, Irish, Jewish and so forth.  There 
is no book that speaks to the history of Islam or Muslims in Kansas City, but there could be.  
Precedence for such a publication has already been set through research conducted in other U.S. 
metropolitan centers.  In Arab Detroit 9/11: Life in the Terror Decade, editors Nabeel Abraham, 
Sally Howell and Andrew Shryock have compiled academic works that capture the Muslim 
American experience in Detroit, Michigan.  Adil Najam’s work Portrait of a Giving Community: 
Philanthropy by the Pakistani-American Diaspora, is a survey on Pakistani charity, conducted in 
most major U.S.’s cities (excluding Kansas City).  Furthermore, Louise Cainkar surveyed 
Muslims in the Chicago metropolitan area in her book, Homeland Insecurity: The Arab 
American and Muslim American Experience After 9/11.  Like The Greater Kansas City Area, 
these cities also have substantial and diverse Muslim American communities.  These preceding 
publications suggest that greater research on the Islamic experience in Kansas City could be 
conducted. 
The observations put forth in this study advance a single and consistent notion to the 
reader:  research potential.  In this case, the potential for broader academic inquiry.  Adil Najam 
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provides these words of encouragement: “Second, there is a need for more comparative research 
on diaspora giving by various diaspora communities.  What has not happened as much, as yet, is 
robust analysis that compares the philanthropic profiles of various diaspora communities.”  
(Najam, 2006: 192)   The complicated ethnic, cultural and socioeconomic fabric that makes up 
Kansas City’s Muslim American community provides great potential for broader and more 
meaningful research. 
The emotional state of Kansas City appears to be a glass half full.  To date, Kansas City 
has had no major anti-Muslim incidents that have surfaced in the media.  The closest anti-
Muslim incident occurred over 150 miles away in Joplin, Missouri during the summer of 2012.  
An arsonist had set fire to the Islamic Center of Joplin that summer on the mornings of 4 July 
and 6 August. This mosque was razed to the ground on the second attempt (Patton, FBI Kansas 
City, 2012).  Oddly enough, the incident was not brought up once during my field interviews.  
The Arab American Institute’s (aaiusa.org) recent U.S. opinion poll on Muslims shows that 
Americans are evenly divided on opinions about Islam:  “41 percent of Americans had 
unfavorable views of Muslims, compared to 40 percent who held favorable views.” (Sacirbeyl, 
2012)  Encouragingly, this poll also shows that a majority of younger Americans (18-29 year 
old) hold a favorable opinion of Islam (53% compared to 34%: 2012 Opinion Survey).  
Moreover, a recent visit to the Kansas City Missouri and Kansas City Kansas Mayors’ offices in 
February 2013 revealed that both city administrations have outreach programs to the Muslim 
American community. 
As of the date of the publication of this thesis, Kansas City seems to be the calm in the 
storm of the Muslim American civil-liberty debate.  Bridging the cultural gap at a city level will 
benefit all involved parties, lending insight to understanding Islam in a global setting.  Jocelyn 
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Cesari provides insight on how further research in the U.S. contributes to the greater 
understanding of Islam: “Muslims in Europe and the United States serve as a sort of lightning 
rod for this crisis [the theology of intolerance vs. the language of hate].  Their position at the 
very heart of the West crystallizes the debates and controversies that are currently shaking the 
entire Muslim world: the question of democracy, Muslim relationship to the ‘Other’, the status of 
women, the lure of fundamentalism.” (Cesari, 2004: 180)  What can be inferred from the 
encouraging statistics above and Cesari’s comments is that conditions are optimal for broader, 
civically engaged research into Kansas City’s Muslim American community. 
More comprehensive research into Kansas City’s Islamic community requires co-opting all 
five types of ‘constituents’ emblematic of successful community based research:  “…Students, 
Organizations in the community, Faculty, Administrators on the campus, Residents in the 
community…” (Bringle, Clayton, Price, 2009: 5).  Four of these types of constituents require 
special mention: 
 Campus administrators: A starting point for this research must be direct coordination with 
the University of Kansas Center for Sustainability, which has a mission to: “Expand the 
capacity for sustainable initiatives through campus-wide networking and community 
outreach.” (www.sustainability.ku.edu)  This center, in collaboration with faculty, aids 
researchers in developing a strategy to approach community based research and assists 
with introduction to community organizations.  Such an effort may also require support 
from the administrative offices of other Kansas City colleges and universities that 
maintain relationships with Kansas City’s religious and civic organizations. 
 Organizations in the Community:  It is essential to gain the buy-in of Kansas City’s 
Islamic Leaders, interfaith organizations, immigration support agencies and city 
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government offices at the outset of research design.  Researchers would need to 
collaborate with Muslim leaders and civic organizations to develop a mutually-beneficial 
research question that serves the needs of the religious community and the Greater 
Kansas City Area while honoring protocols and academic standards of the University.  
These community partners can also secure introductions to more city organizations and 
research resources.   Currently, this research’s focus is myopic; it does not explore U.S. 
policy below national legislation.  Collaboration with community organizations would 
mitigate this limitation by including state and local legislation, ordinances and even 
public perceptions. The list of Kansas City constituents or stakeholders below serves as a 
good starting place for community partnerships: 
- The Midland Islamic Council (midlandcouncil.com) 
- The Islamic Society of the Greater Kansas City (isgkc.org)  
- The Crescent Peace Society (crescentpeace.org)  
- The Kansas City Chapter of The American Coalition for Good Government 
(americancoalitionforgoodgovernment.org) 
- The Muslim Student Associations of Kansas City 
- Greater Kansas City Interfaith Council (kcinterfaith.org) 
- Jewish Vocational Services (jvskc.org) 
- Don Bosco Center (donbosco.org) 
- The mayor’s office of Kansas City, Missouri (kcmayor.org) 
- The mayor’s office of Kansas City, Kansas (wycokck.org) 
 
 Residents in the community: Participant volunteers for expanded research must include 
persons from Shi’ite, Sufi, and other Muslim communities that represent the whole of 
Islam.  Participant groups should involve diasporas from the Arab States, the Balkan 
Peninsula, Southeast Asia and other predominantly Muslim countries.  Volunteers for 
focus group discussions, interviews and surveys must include more women and second 
generation Muslim Americans.   
 Students:  The amount of coordination, research, fieldwork and data analysis alone may 
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require a multidisciplinary team of students in such fields as globalization, anthropology, 
social science, political science, languages, statistics and religious studies.   
Greater research into Kansas City’s Muslim American community will also mean looking 
into all aspects of American Islam.  This implies conducting research with more mosques spread 
across the fifteen counties that make up Kansas City (bls.gov).  It would be impossible to get 
cooperation with all 18 Muslim congregations (ARDA, 2010) and the estimated ten Islamic 
faith-based institutions (Chapter 1) across Kansas City, but gaining participation with even one 
mosque in each county would produce far better representation of the city’s Muslim American 
community.  As daunting as it sounds, such a research project would bring to the forefront an 
ethnically and culturally diverse community that often is marginalized by U.S. society.  Broader 
research would also underscore the successes and continued challenges of Kansas City’s 
enduring multiculturalism.  
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Acronyms used in this research: 
AEDPA: Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
AHIF: Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation 
BIF: Benevolence International Foundation 
DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency 
EIN: Employer Identification Number 
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FinCEN: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
GCO: Goodwill Charitable Organization 
GRF: Global Relief Foundation 
HLF: Holy Land Foundation 
IARA: Islamic American Relief Agency 
ICE: U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
ICJC:  Islamic Center of Johnson County 
IEEPA: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
IRS: Internal Revenue Service 
ISGKC: Islamic Society of the Greater Kansas City 
LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
NTEE: National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
OFAC: Office of Foreign Assets Control  
SDGT: Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
TAR: Terrorist Asset Report 
TWEA: Trading With the Enemy Act 
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Arabic terms used in this research: 
*Transliterated from the International Journal of Middle East Studies at: 
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/ijmes/pages/transliteration.html 
 
Assalamu alaikum:  Arabic greeting, literally: “Peace be upon you”. 
Da’wah: Islamic outreach, spreading of the Islamic faith 
Eid al Adha:  Muslim feast of the Sacrifice. 
Hadīth:  The collective body of traditions relating to Muhammad and his companions. 
Hawala:  Informal money networks used to transfer wealth across national boundaries. 
Ḥijīb: Headscarf covering for Muslim women. 
 Ibadīt: Acts of Muslim worship.  
Ighatha: Providing relief, humanitarian assistance, or life saving measures. 
Jihād: Literally ‘to struggle’. 
Jum’ah: The Friday prayer. 
Khuṭbah: A Muslim sermon . 
Masjid: Mosque. 
Maṣlaḥa: Generally defined as the greater good of the community. 
Mujāhidīn: Islamic Holy Warriors 
Qu’ran: The most sacred text of Islam, literally the word of God (Allah) as revealed to the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
 
Rak’ahs:  A physical component of Muslim daily prayer that involves bowing and prostration. 
Ramadan:  The ninth month of the Islamic calendar that commemorates God revealing the 
Qu’ran to the Prophet Muhammad.  The month is marked with daily fasting, prayer, and giving 
of alms 
 
Ribā: Interest on a loan, an economic practice that is forbidden in Islam 
Ṣadaqah: Compulsive charity 
Ṣalāt: Prayer, prescribed five times daily for all Muslims and second pillar of Islam 
Ṣhahādah:  The declaration/profession of Islamic Faith and first pillar of Islam 
Sunnah:  Words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad as relayed by his companions 
Zakāt: Charity or alms, the third pillar of Islam 
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(Appendix A-1) Islamic Organizations in the Greater Kansas City Area 
Organization 
Name 
Location Type of 
Organization 
Employer 
Identification 
Number (EIN) 
Web Address 
Al-Inshirah 
Islamic Center 
3664 Troost Ave, 
Kansas City, MO 
64109 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
43-1622042 Alinshirah.com 
Al Kahf Center 4206 9
th
 St, 
Kansas City, MO 
64124 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
N/A kahf.org/wp 
Az-Zahra 
Center 
 
8350 Leavenworth 
Rd, Kansas City, 
KS 66109 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
48-1249208 Az-zahra.org 
Bantu 
Community 
Association 
2300 Main St, 
Kansas City, MO 
64108 
Ethnic, Immigrant 
Services 
35-2308026 sbantu.org 
Crescent Peace 
Society 
12709 Eaton 
Circle, Leawood, 
KS 66209 
Civil Rights, Social 
Action, Advocacy 
74-2842939 crescentpeace.org 
Foundation for 
Intelligent 
Giving 
623 W. 62
nd
 St, 
Kansas City, MO 
64113 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
27-2126610 N/A 
Islamic Center 
of Johnson 
County 
9001 W 151st 
Street, Overland 
Park, KS 66221 
Religious Worship 56-2346638 icjc.org 
Islamic Center 
of Kansas Inc 
 
14750 West 143d 
St, Olathe, KS 
66062 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
48-1253151 ickansas.org 
Islamic Center 
of Leavenworth 
545 Oregon, 
Leavenworth, KS 
66048 
Religious Worship 48-1174139 leavenworthmuslim.or
g 
Islamic Center 
of Northland, 
Inc. 
900 NE Vivion 
Rd, Kansas City, 
MO 64116 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
27-0109378 icnkc.org 
Islamic Circle 
of North 
America 
8941 Cambridge 
Ave, Kansas City, 
MO 64138 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
26-3566016 icnakc.org 
Islamic Society 
of the Greater 
Kansas City 
8501 E 99th St, 
Kansas City MO 
64134 
School, Religious 
Worship 
43-1528289 isgkc.org 
Islamic 
Women’s 
Society of 
Kansas City 
PO Box 287894, 
Kansas City, MO 
64128  
Civil Rights 
Advocacy 
43-1754015 N/A 
Kulturni Center 
Bosnjak 
3607 NE Antioch 
Rd, Kansas City, 
MO 64117 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
41-2236445 N/A 
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(Appendix A-2) Islamic Organizations in the Greater Kansas City Area 
 
Organization 
Name 
Location Type of 
Organization 
Employer 
Identification 
Number (EIN) 
Web Address 
Masjid Al-
Huda 
4602 St. John 
Ave, Kansas City, 
MO 64123 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
N/A alhudakc.org 
Masjid Anas 
Bin Malik 
2311E. 29
th
 St, 
Kansas City, MO 
64109 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
36-4729364 masjidanasbinmalik.co
m 
Masjid Omar 2700 E. 49
th
 St, 
Kansas City, MO 
64130 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
43-167305 N/A 
Masjidu Noor 
Islamic 
Community 
Center 
2639 E. 11
th
 St, 
Kansas City, MO 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
N/A N/A 
Muslim 
American 
Society 
10107 W 105TH 
St Overland Park, 
KS 66212 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
36-3885457 maskansascity.org 
Muslim 
American 
Society of 
Kansas City, 
Kansas 
1125 N. 32
nd
 St, 
Kansas city, KS 
66102 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
30-0058385 N/A 
Muslim 
American 
Society (Kansas 
City, MO) 
9520 James A. 
Reed Rd, Kansas 
City, MO 64134 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
N/A N/A 
Muslim 
Association of 
Kansas City 
10308 Metcalf, 
Suite 158, 
Overland Park, 
KS 66212 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
48-1121172 N/A 
Muslim 
Students 
Association of 
Greater Kansas 
City INC 
5501 Charlotte St.  
Kansas city, MO 
64110 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
43-1588075 N/A 
Pakistani 
American 
Society of 
Greater Kansas 
City 
3520 W. 75
th
 St, 
Kansas City, 
Kansas 66208 
Culture and 
Performing Arts 
48-1173827 pasgkc.com 
Raindrop 
Turkish House, 
Kansas City 
9903 Pflumm Rd, 
Lenexa, KS 66215 
Educational, 
Charitable and 
Cultural outreach 
76-0664313 raindropturkishhouse.
org/Kansascity 
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(Appendix A-3) Islamic Organizations in the Greater Kansas City Area 
 
Organization 
Name 
Location Type of 
Organization 
Employer 
Identification 
Number (EIN) 
Web Address 
Somali Center 
of Kansas City 
1340 Admiral 
Blvd, Kansas City, 
MO 64106 
Religion, Spiritual 
Development 
16-1641824 http://www.somalibant
uofkansas.org 
Somali 
Foundation Inc 
1101 Euclid Ave, 
Kansas City, MO 
64127 
Ethnic, Immigrant 
Services 
48-1844824 N/A 
Universal 
Academy 
Islamic School 
10515 Grandview, 
Kansas City, MO 
64137 
Islamic Education N/A universalacademy.web
s.com 
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(Appendix B-1) Budget Comparisons   
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(Appendix B-2) Budget Comparisons   
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(Appendix B-3) Budget Comparisons   
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(Appendix B-4) Budget Comparisons   
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(Appendix B-5) Budget Comparisons   
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(Appendix B-6) Budget Comparisons 
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(Appendix C-1) Adult Informed Consent Form 
Page 1 of 3 
ADULT INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
 
Islamic Not-for-profit sector in the Greater Kansas City Area 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Department of Global and International Studies at the University of Kansas supports the 
practice of protection for human subjects participating in research.  The following information is 
provided for you to decide whether you wish to participate in the present study.  You may refuse 
to sign this form and not participate in this study.  You should be aware that even if you agree to 
participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.  If you do withdraw from this study, it will not 
affect your relationship with this unit, the services it may provide to you, or the University of 
Kansas. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: Explore the impact of U.S. Anti-Terrorist Funding legislation and 
policies since 9-11 on Kansas City's Islamic charitable organizations 
 
PROCEDURES:   You will be asked to participate in a focus group discussion with several other 
members of your organization.  This focus group discussion will take no more than 90 minutes to 
complete and will be followed by a 20 minute written survey.   The purpose of this focus group 
is to promote discussion about your organization’s charitable practices.  No video or audiotapes 
will be used in the interview process.  If a digital camera is used, it will not be employed without 
your express consent.  If used, digital cameras will only be for the purpose of archiving the 
research process.  All research materials (notes, handouts, and digital pictures) will be secured 
under lock and key by the interviewer. 
 
RISKS:  This research poses no risk to one’s mental of physical health – you can chose not to 
answer any of the questions presented to you. 
 
BENEFITS: There are no anticipated benefits to the individual for participating in this research.    
 
PAYMENT TO PARTICIPANTS:  There is no payment for participating in this research. 
 
PARTICIPANT CONFIDENTIALITY:  Your name will not be released or associated in any 
publication or presentation with the information collected about you or with the research findings 
from this study.  Instead, if required, the researcher(s) will use a study number or a pseudonym 
rather than your name.  Your identifiable information will not be shared unless (a) it is required 
by law or university policy, or (b) you give written permission.  The information from this 
interview will be used solely in academic research and the permission granted on this date to use 
and disclose your information remains in effect indefinitely.  By signing this form you give 
permission for the use and disclosure of your information for purposes of this study at any time 
in the future."  
 
INSTITUTIONAL DISCLAIMER STATEMENT  (Not applicable) 
 
REFUSAL TO SIGN CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
Approved by the Human Subjects Committee University of 
Kansas, Lawrence Campus (HSCL).  Approval expires one 
year from 10/2/2012                                          HSCL # 20324 
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(Appendix C-2) Adult Informed Consent Form (continued) 
Page 2 of 3 
 
You are not required to sign this Consent and Authorization form and you may refuse to do so 
without affecting your right to any services you are receiving or may receive from the University 
of Kansas or to participate in any programs or events of the University of Kansas.  However, if 
you refuse to sign, you cannot participate in this study. 
 
CANCELLING THIS CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
 
You may withdraw your consent to participate in this study at any time.  You also have the right 
to cancel your permission to use and disclose further information collected about you, in writing, 
at any time, by sending your written request to:   
 
Joe Hall 
Global and Internation Studies 
University of Kansas, Edwards Campus 
12600 Quivara Rd 
Overland Park, KS 66213  
 
If you cancel permission to use your information, the researchers will stop collecting additional 
information about you.  However, the research team may use and disclose information that was 
gathered before they received your cancellation, as described above.  
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION 
 
Questions about procedures should be directed to the researcher(s) listed at the end of this 
consent form. 
 
PARTICIPANT CERTIFICATION: 
 
I have read this Consent and Authorization form. I have had the opportunity to ask, and I have 
received answers to, any questions I had regarding the study.  I understand that if I have any 
additional questions about my rights as a research participant, I may call (785) 864-7429 or (785) 
864-7385, write the Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of 
Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7568, or email irb@ku.edu.  
 
I agree to take part in this study as a research participant.  By my signature I affirm that I am at 
least 21 years old and that I have received a copy of this Consent and Authorization form.  
 
_______________________________         _____________________  
           Type/Print Participant's Name   Date 
 
 _________________________________________     
                               Participant's Signature 
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(Appendix C-3) Adult Informed Consent Form (continued) 
Page 3 of 3 
 
Researcher Contact Information 
 
Joe Hall    Majid Hannoum 
Principal Investigator      Faculty Supervisor 
Global and International Studies. Associate Professor, Anthropology. 
4613 Summit St. Apt 2S   1415 Jayhawk Blvd 
Kansas City, MO 64112       University of Kansas 
913 702 4464     Lawrence, KS  66045 
     785 864 2650 
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